Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh

by Admin | Jul 22, 2013 | Highlights

The Accord on Fire and Bulding Safety in Bangladesh, backed by the International trade union IndustriALL and the Bangladeshi government, was released on 8 July. It has gathered 75 signatories which are major European retailers. Under the Accord, International teams of fire and building safety inspectors, working with inspectors in Bangladesh  will inspect garment supply factories in Bangladesh within nine months to identify “grave hazards” and the need for “urgent repairs”. A central aspect to the Accord, is that it involved workers and their representatives. It also commits signatories to staying in Bangladesh for at least two years of the accord.The Plan also ensures that there is sufficient funds available to fix serious fire and building safety problems in any of the factories that retailers use in Bangladesh

Detail of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh is presented below:

The undersigned parties are committed to the goal of a safe and sustainable Bangladeshi Ready-Made Garment (“RMG”) industry in which no worker needs to fear fires, building collapses, or other accidents that could be prevented with reasonable health and safety measures.

The signatories to this Agreement agree to establish a fire and building safety program in Bangladesh for a period of five years.

The programme will build on the National Action Plan on Fire Safety (NAP), which expressly welcomes the development and implementation by any stakeholder of any other activities that would constitute a meaningful contribution to improving fire safety in Bangladesh. The signatories commit to align this programme and its activities with the NAP and to ensure a close collaboration, including for example by establishing common programme, liaison and advisory structures.

The signatories also welcome a strong role for the International Labour Organization (ILO), through the Bangladesh office as well as through international programmes, to ensure that both the National Action Plan, and the programme foreseen by the signatories of this Agreement, get implemented

The signatories shall develop and agree an Implementation Plan within 45 days of signing this Agreement. The nongovernmental organizations which are signatories to the Joint Memorandum of Understanding on Fire and Building Safety (dated March 15, 2012), having stated their intention to support the implementation of this programme, shall, at their own election, be signed witnesses to this Agreement.

This Agreement commits the signatories to finance and implement a programme that will take cognizance of the Practical Activities described in the NAPinvolving, at minimum, the following elements:

 SCOPE:

The agreement covers all suppliers producing products for the signatory companies. The signatories shall designate these suppliers as falling into the following categories, according to which they shall require these supplier to accept inspections and implement remediation measures in their factories according to the following breakdown:

1. Safety inspections, remediation and fire safety training at facilities representing, in the aggregate, not less than 30%, approximately, of each signatory company’s annual production in Bangladesh by volume (“Tier 1 factories”).
2. Inspection and remediation at any remaining major or long-term suppliers to each company (“Tier 2 factories”). Together, Tier 1 and Tier 2 factories shall represent not less than 65%, approximately, of each signatory company’s production in Bangladesh by volume.
3. Limited initial inspections to identify high risks at facilities with occasional orders, one-time orders or those for which a company’s orders represent less than 10% of the factory’s production in Bangladesh by volume (“Tier 3 factories”). Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to alleviate the obligation of each signatory company to ensure that those factories it designates as Tier 3 represent, in the aggregate, no more than 35%, approximately, of its production in Bangladesh by volume. Facilities determined, as a result of initial inspection, to be high risk shall be subject to the same treatment as if they were Tier 2 factories.

 GOVERNANCE

1. The signatories shall appoint a Steering Committee (SC) with equal representation chosen by the trade union signatories and company signatories (maximum 3 seats each) and a representative from and chosen by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as a neutral chair. The SC shall have responsibility for the selection, contracting, compensation and review of the performance of a Safety Inspector and a Training Coordinator; oversight and approval of the programme budget; oversight of financial reporting and hiring of auditors; and such other management duties as may be required. The SC will strive to reach decision by consensus, but, in the absence of consensus, decisions will be made by majority vote. In order to develop the activity of the SC, a Governance regulation will be developed.
2. Dispute resolution. Any dispute between the parties to, and arising under, the terms of this Agreement shall first be presented to and decided by the SC, which shall decide the dispute by majority vote of the SC within a maximum of 21 days of a petition being filed by one of the parties. Upon request of either party, the decision of the SC may be appealed to a final and binding arbitration process. Any arbitration award shall be enforceable in a court of law of the domicile of the signatory against whom enforcement is sought and shall be subject to The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (The New York Convention), where applicable. The process for binding arbitration, including, but not limited to, the allocation of costs relating to any arbitration and the process for selection of the Arbitrator, shall be governed by the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (with amendments as adopted in 2006).
3. The signatories shall appoint an Advisory Board involving brands and retailers, suppliers, government institutions, trade unions, and NGOs. . The advisory board will ensure all stakeholders, local and international, can engage in constructive dialogue with each other and provide feedback and input to the SC, thereby enhancing quality, efficiency, credibility and synergy. The SC will consult the parties to the NAP to determine the feasibility of a shared advisory structure.
4. Administration and management of the programme will be developed by the SC in consultation with the ‘High-Level Tripartite Committee’ established to implement and oversee the National Action Plan on Fire Safety, as well as with the Ministry of Labour and Employment of Bangladesh (MoLE), the ILO and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), to maximize synergy at operational level; and the SC may make use of the offices of GIZ for administrative coordination and support.

 CREDIBLE INSPECTIONS:

1. A qualified Safety Inspector, with fire and building safety expertise and impeccable credentials, and who is independent of and not concurrently employed by companies, trade unions or factories, shall be appointed by the SC. Providing the Chief Inspector acts in a manner consistent with his or her mandate under the provisions of this Agreement, and unless there is clear evidence of malfeasance or incompetence on his or her part, the SC shall not restrict or otherwise interfere with the Chief Inspector’s performance of the duties set forth in the Agreement as he or she sees fit, including the scheduling of inspections and the publishing of reports.
2. Thorough and credible safety inspections of Tier 1, 2 and 3 factories shall be carried out by skilled personnel selected by and acting under the direction of the Safety Inspector, based on internationally recognized workplace safety standards and/or national standards (once the review foreseen under the NAP is completed in June 2013). The Safety Inspector shall make all reasonable efforts toensure that an initial inspection of each factory covered by this Agreement shall be carried out within the first two years of the term of this Agreement. The Safety Inspector will be available to provide input into the NAP legislative review and to support capacity building work regarding inspections by the MoLE foreseen under the NAP.
3. Where a signatory company’s inspection programme, in the opinion of the Safety Inspector, meets or exceeds the standards of thorough and credible inspections, as defined by the Safety Inspector, it will be considered an integral part of the programme activities set forth in this Agreement. Signatory companies wishing to have their inspection programme so considered shall provide the Safety Inspector full access to the findings of their inspections and he or she will integrate these into reporting and remediation activities. Notwithstanding this provision, all factories within the scope of this Agreement shall still be subject to all the provisions of this Agreement, including but not limited to a least one safety inspection carried out by personnel acting under the direction of the Safety Inspector.
4. Written Inspection Reports of all factories inspected under the programme shall be prepared by the Safety Inspector within two (2) weeks of the date of inspection and shared upon completion with factory management, the factory’s health and safety committee, worker representatives (where one or more unions are present), signatory companies and the SC. Where, in the opinion of the Safety Inspector, there is not a functioning health and safety committee at the factory, the report will be shared with the unions which are the signatories to this Agreement. Within a timeline agreed by the SC, but no greater than six weeks, the Safety Inspector shall disclose the Inspection Report to the public, accompanied by the factory’s remediation plan, if any. In the event that, in the opinion of the Safety Inspector, the inspection identifies a severe and imminent danger to worker safety, he or she shall immediately inform factory management, the factory’s health and safety committee, worker representatives (where one or more unions are present), the Steering Committee and unions which are signatories to this Agreement, and direct a remediation plan.

 REMEDIATION:

1. Where corrective actions are identified by the Safety Inspector as necessary to bring a factory into compliance with building, fire and electrical safety standards, the signatory company or companies that have designated that factory as a Tier 1, 2, or 3 supplier, shall require that factory to implement these corrective actions, according to a schedule that is mandatory and time-bound, with sufficient time allotted for all major renovations.
2. Signatory companies shall require their supplier factories that are inspected under the Program to maintain workers’ employment relationship and regular income during any period that a factory (or portion of a factory) is closed for renovations necessary to complete such Corrective Actions for a period of no longer than six months. Failure to do so may trigger a notice, warning and ultimately termination of the business relationship as described in paragraph 21.
3. Signatory companies shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that any workers whose employment is terminated as a result of any loss of orders at a factory are offered employment with safe suppliers, if necessary by actively working with other suppliers to provide hiring preferences to these workers.
4. Signatory companies shall require their supplier factories to respect the right of a worker to refuse work that he or she has reasonable justification to believe is unsafe, without suffering discrimination or loss of pay, including the right to refuse to enter or to remain inside a building that he or she has reasonable justification to believe is unsafe for occupation.

 TRAINING:

1. The Training Coordinator appointed by the SC shall establish an extensive fire and building safety training program. The training program shall be delivered by a selected skilled personnel by the Training Coordinator at Tier 1 facilities for workers, managers and security staff to be delivered with involvement of trade unions and specialized local experts. These training programmes shall cover basic safety procedures and precautions, as well as enable workers to voice concerns and actively participate in activities to ensure their own safety. Signatory companies shall require their suppliers to provide access to their factories to training teams designated by the Training Coordinator that include safety training experts as well as qualified union representatives to provide safety training to workers and management on a regular basis.
2. Health and Safety Committees shall be required by the signatory companies in all Bangladesh factories that supply them, which shall function in accordance with Bangladeshi law, and be comprised of workers and managers from the applicable factory. Worker members shall comprise no less than 50% of the committee and shall be chosen by the factory’s trade union, if rresent, and by democratic election among the workers where there is no trade union present.

 COMPLAINTS PROCESS:

1. The Safety Inspector shall establish a worker complaint process and mechanism that ensures that workers from factories supplying signatory companies can raise in a timely fashion concerns about health and safety risks, safely and confidentially, with the Safety Inspector. This should be aligned with the Hotline to be established under the NAP.

 TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING:

1. The SC shall make publicly available and regularly update information on key aspects of the programme, including:
   1. a single aggregated list of all suppliers in Bangladesh (including sub-contractors) used by the signatory companies, based on data which shall be provided to the SC and regularly updated by each of the signatory companies, and which shall indicate which factories on this list have been designated by that company as Tier 1 factories and which have been designated by that company as Tier 2 factories, however volume data and information linking specific companies to specific factories will be kept confidential,
   2. Written Inspection Reports, which shall be developed by the Safety Inspector for all factories inspected under this programme, shall be disclosed to interested parties and the public as set forth in paragraph 11 of this Agreement.

Public statements by the Safety Inspector identifying any factory that is not acting expeditiously to implement remedial recommendations.

1. Quarterly Aggregate Reports that summarize both aggregated industry compliance data as well as a detailed review of findings, remedial recommendations, and progress on remediation to date for all factories at which inspections have been completed.
2. The signatories to this Agreement shall work together with other organizations such as ILO and the High-Level Tripartite Committee andthe Bangladeshi Government to encourage the establishment of a protocol seeking to ensure that suppliers which participate fully in the inspection and remediation activities of this Agreement shall not be penalised as a result of the transparency provisions of this Agreement. The objectives of the protocol are to (i) support and motivate the employer to take remediation efforts in the interest of the workforce and the sector and (ii) expedite prompt legal action where the supplier refuses to undertake the remedial action required to become compliant with national law.

 SUPPLIER INCENTIVES:

1. Each  signatory company shall require that its suppliers in Bangladesh participate fully in the inspection, remediation, health and safety and, where applicable, training activities, as described in the Agreement. If a supplier fails to do so, the signatory will promptly implement a notice and warning process leading to termination of the business relationship if these efforts do not succeed.
2. In order to induce Tier 1 and Tier 2 factories to comply with upgrade and remediation requirements of the program, participating brands and retailers will negotiate commercial terms with their suppliers which ensure that it is financially feasible for the factories to maintain safe workplaces and comply with upgrade and remediation requirements instituted by the Safety Inspector. Each signatory company may, at its option, use alternative means to ensure factories have the financial capacity to comply with remediation requirements, including but not limited to joint investments, providing loans, accessing donor or government support, through offering business incentives or through paying for renovations directly.
3. Signatory companies to this agreement are committed to maintaining long-term sourcing relationships with Bangladesh, as is demonstrated by their commitment to this five-year programme. Signatory companies shall continue business at order volumes comparable to or greater than those that existed in the year preceding the inception of this Agreement with Tier 1 and Tier 2 factories at least through the first two years of the term of this Agreement, provided that (a) such business is commercially viable for each company and (b) the factory continues to substantially meet the company’s terms and comply with the company’s requirements of its supplier factories under this agreement.

 FINANCIAL SUPPORT:

1. In addition to their obligations pursuant to this Agreement, signatory companies shall also assume responsibility for funding the activities of the SC, Safety Inspector and Training Coordinator as set forth in this Agreement, with each company contributing its equitable share of the funding in accordance with  a formula to be established in the Implementation Plan. The SC shall be empowered to seek contributions from governmental and other donors to contribute to costs. Each signatory company shall contribute funding for these activities in proportion to the annual volume of each company’s garment production in Bangladesh relative to the respective annual volumes of garment production of the other signatory companies, subject to a maximum contribution of $500,000 per year for each year of the term of this Agreement. A sliding scale of minimum contributions based on factors such as revenues and annual volume in Bangladesh will be defined in the Implementation Plan with annual revisions, while ensuring sufficient funding for the adequate implementation of the Accord and the Plan.
2. The SC shall ensure that there are credible, robust, and transparent procedure for the accounting and oversight of all contributed funds.

Share your thought about the Accord on fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh and the issue “Worker Safety Standard” with Boston Global Forum.

U.S guides Bangladesh to regain its trade privileges

by Admin | Jul 22, 2013 | Highlights

The Obama administration released an “action plan” on Friday (July 19) pressing Bangladesh to significantly increase the number of labor, fire and building inspectors and to improve their training.

Three weeks after announcing that U.S would suspend Bangladesh’s trade preferences, the Obama administration publicly recommended a series of steps that the Bangladesh government should take to regain its trade privileges with the United States, such as:

• significantly increase the number of labor, fire and building inspectors and to improve their training;
• impose stiffer penalties, including taking away export licenses, on garment factories that violate labor, fire or building safety standards;
• create a public database of all garment factories for reporting labor, fire and building inspections, including information on violations found, penalties assessed and violations corrected, with the names of the lead inspectors;
• establish “an effective complaint mechanism, including a hot line” for workers to anonymously report fire, building and workers’ rights violations

Besides, the Obama administration also urged Bangladesh to carry out measures to ensure the unionization progress and to publicly report information on the status and outcomes of individual unionization efforts.

Whether this series of steps that the Obama administration has released are enough to boost Bangladesh’s trade? Join our discussion and share your view with us.

Is Corporate Social Responsibility Associated with Lower Wages?

by Admin | Jul 21, 2013 | Highlights

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become a popular concept among corporations in the past few decades, as firms wish to convey to the public their commitment to various environmental and social causes, as well as the ethical treatment of workers. Still, high-profile controversies such as the working conditions at Foxconn, Apple’s manufacturing supplier in China, or the 2013 collapse of a garment factory in Bangladesh, continue to raise questions about integrity and corporate values embedded within global supply chains.

The narrow definition of CSR originally given by Milton Friedman is that of exclusively unprofitable actions intended to create positive societal benefits. However, when such acts are profitable Friedman argues that they cease to constitute CSR and become “hypocritical window dressing.” Conversely, corporations such as Nestle have expanded CSR to the concept of Creating Shared Value (CSV), wherein companies engage in activities which are both socially beneficial and profitable.

Much research has been done on the effect of CSR on the profitability of firms, with one 2003 meta-study finding a positive relationship between CSR and financial performance of firms across 52 studies from various industries. This could likely be the result of consumers placing a premium on goods produced by socially responsible companies. Furthermore, the motivations of corporate leadership to engage in socially responsible production or activities can vary, with some doing so as a result of an internal sense of obligation and others from external pressure. However, limited research has been done on how individuals evaluate potential employers with respect to CSR, and what value, with respect to wages, they put on working for a socially responsible employer.

A 2013 study by researchers at the University of Oslo published in Environmental and Resource Economics, “Is Corporate Social Responsibility Associated with Lower Wages?” examines the relationship between a firm’s reputation for corporate social responsibility and its employees’ wages. The researchers utilize 2006-2007 survey data from Universum, a global branding firm for companies, on firms’ reputations for CSR among graduate students and young professionals. They analyze the relationships among CSR reputation data, employee wages and demographic characteristics.

Key findings include:

• Without accounting for industry or demographic information, the relationship between a firm’s CSR reputation and employee wages was very negative. A firm with a strong reputation of CSR, a score of 1, on average paid 38% lower wages than a firm with a poor reputation of CSR, a score of 0.
• When gender is accounted for, firms with a relative CSR score of 1 would be expected to pay 42% lower wages than firms with a relative CSR score of 0. Furthermore, the wage differential between men and women is 19%.
• When differences in wages due to industry are accounted for, firms with a CSR score of 1 are expected to pay 24% less on average than those with a CSR score of 0. The authors suggest that this is because “some industries (e.g. health and care giving) presumably have a better reputation in terms of social responsibility than others (e.g. petroleum and mining).”
• Firms that have higher degrees of gender equality frequently offer lower wages than firms with lower gender equality levels, but the comparative difference is “considerably smaller for females.” The expected wage loss for men working at a firm with a reputation for “gender equality” and high CSR (1), as opposed to low CSR (0), was 18%, while women could only expect a 6% loss.

Overall, the study finds that there is a significant negative relationship between employee wages and the reputation of an employer for being socially responsible. Furthermore, there was a strong relationship found between gender equality and CSR in firms, with the authors suggesting that women may be more inclined to join more socially responsible firms. The authors conclude that “firms associated with CSR do indeed have a cost advantage in terms of lower wage payments as compared to other firms. One implication is that even if social responsibility is associated with higher costs… responsible firms may survive market competition — even in the absence of ethical consumers or investors.”

– See more at: http://journalistsresource.org/studies/economics/jobs/is-corporate-social-responsibility-associated-with-lower-wages#sthash.92GRcvWs.dpuf

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Professor Thomas E. Patterson, member of Board of Directors, Board of Thinkers, Boston Global Forum.

The Promise and Perils of Private Voluntary Regulation: Labor Standards and Work Organization in Two Mexican Garment Factories

by Admin | Jul 21, 2013 | Highlights

As supply chains stretch around the globe, scrutiny of working conditions in distant factories has increased. But international labor standards often depend on corporations engaging in “private voluntary regulation,” and even when such standards are adhered to, factory floor dynamics may determine their actual effectiveness.

A 2012 study by researchers at the MIT Sloan School of Management and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), “The Promise and Perils of Private Voluntary Regulation: Labor Standards and Work Organization in Two Mexican Garment Factories,” evaluates conditions at two Nike facilities in Mexico (referred to as Plant A and Plant B). Published in the Review of International Political Economy, the study involved field research and more than 90 interviews with factory owners, managers, workers and NGO representatives.

The findings include:

• Both facilities respected minimum wage laws, but workers in Plant A were paid more than those in Plant B; in addition, they received productivity bonuses based on team work, while Plant B based bonuses on individual work.
• Both plants adhered to Nike’s policy on working hours and overtime pay, but workers in Plant A were more likely to receive overtime than those in Plant B because they were made more aware of the policy.
• Workers at Plant A enjoyed more job satisfaction, had a higher degree of input in decision-making and had a greater degree of flexibility between team and individual work than those at Plant B.
• Plant A demonstrated better labor standards and was more productive than Plant B, despite its smaller size and less complex product mix. This contradicts earlier studies that suggested that larger, more bureaucratic factories and a more complex product mix would lead to better respect for labor standards.
• Plant A was closer to Nike’s regional office in Mexico City than Plant B, and this had a positive impact on labor standards. Plant A was also in an industrialized area near other factories, creating more competition for labor than Plant B.
• “More frequent visits and more open communication between Nike’s regional staff and management at Plant A led to the development of greater trust and a better working relationship between these two actors. This, in turn, contributed to the upgrading of Plant A’s production system and its consequent positive impact on working conditions at the plant.”
• Plant A was owned and operated by local firm in Mexico, whereas Plant B was operated by a Taiwanese company, significantly changing management-labor dynamics. Workers in Plant A tended to be treated better and viewed as valuable assets; those at Plant B were viewed as expendable by the management, which often favored hiring Asians workers because they were considered more productive.
• International ownership could negatively impact work standards because workers have greater difficulty voicing their concerns. In addition, there can be more willingness by management to move to another country or hire other nonresidents if labor issues arise.

Overall, the study demonstrates that two very similar factories – each evaluated by corporate management as being roughly equal in terms of labor standards compliance — can have different ground-level outcomes. The researchers suggest that “a more systemic approach, one that combines external (countervailing) pressure, comprehensive and transparent monitoring systems, and a variety of ‘management systems’ interventions aimed at eliminating the root causes of poor working conditions, is required to promote improved labor standards for the millions of workers employed in global supply chain factories.”

See more at: http://journalistsresource.org/studies/economics/business/labor-standards-international-factories#sthash.Sq1k692t.dpuf

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Professor Thomas E. Patterson, member of Board of Directors, Board of Thinkers, Boston Global Forum.

Book Review- ‘The Promise & Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global Economy’ – Richard M Locke

by Admin | Jul 16, 2013 | Highlights

The Bangladesh factory collapse has extorted suggestions and analysis from experts in various fields. But few examine the issue through an empirical lens. Brown University Professor (currently at MIT’s Political Science Department) Richard M Locke’s latest book The Promise & Limits of Private Power, published in April 2013, aims to do just that.

The review below, taken from an online MIT portal , outlines the structure of the book and defines its basic contributions.

The Promise & Limits of Private Power examines and evaluates various private initiatives to enforce fair labor standards within global supply chains Using unique data (internal audit reports, access to over 120 supply chain factories and 700 interviews in 14 countries) from several major global brands (NlKE, Hewlett Packard, Philips van Heusen) and the ILO’s Factory Improvement program in Vietnam, this book examines both the promise and the limitations of these approaches to actually improve working conditions, wages, working hours for the millions of workers employed in today’s global supply chains. Through a careful, empirically-grounded analysis of these programs, this book manuscript illustrates what mix of private and public regulation is needed to address these complex issues in a global economy.

The book makes three basic contributions:

1) First, it makes an empirical contribution in that this is the first study (in fact, the only study) that  has been able to gain access to the internal factory audits of major corporations and analyze them to show how things are  really working in the thousands of factories scattered throughout the developing world that  produce the goods we consume every day. These audit reports (data) coupled with  unprecedented access to over 100 factories supply several major brands creates a unique opportunity to shed light on and analyze current labor conditions and labor rights within today’s global supply chains.

2) Second, the book manuscript makes a theoretical contribution by exploring how regulation (both private voluntary regulation and state regulation) need to combine to tackle these labor problems, and how this unfolds in a world of shifting firm boundaries, dynamic supply chains, and growing efforts to complement traditional forms of regulation with emerging private forms of regulation.

3) Finally, the book makes a practical contribution by showing what works and what does not and suggesting pragmatic strategies for key actors (multinational corporations, transnational NGOs, governments, etc.)

An adaptation of his book can be read at Boston Review’s online forum dedicated to the subject- ‘Can Global Brands Create Just Supply Chains?’

BRAC- empowering Bangladesh’s poor through social change

by Admin | Jul 16, 2013 | Highlights

(In)Famous for the Rana Plaza Factory collapse, its struggling economy and poverty, Bangladesh’s worthwhile successes have escaped most of public knowledge until recently. PBS reports on BRAC, formerly, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee  , the world’s largest non-governmental organization serving 160 million people in the country. Started by Fazle Abed, BRAC caters to the this South Asian country’s problems through microfinance schemes ($9 billion), lending money to small and medium businesses (earning itself the title of the fifth largest commercial bank in the country), runs over 38,000 schools and has trained over 100,000 village health workers in public health, as reported by PBS in this article.

In addition to its existing projects, BRAC has devoted itself to monitoring improvements that have been promised since the Rana factory disaster. In this PBS story, BRAC founder Fazle Hasan Abed, describes his organizations efforts to provide rehabilitation, artificial limbs and assistance in collecting compensation for scores of survivors. The story further explores the role of labor unions, and conveys messages from women workers who struggle to earn a living in a traditional society

Worker Safety: change after Bangladesh incident and Beyond

by Admin | Jul 16, 2013 | Highlights

The Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh in April 2013 that killed over 1,000 people is a clarion call about the urgent need to improve safety standards for garment workers in developing countries. Government interventions, coupled with urgent recommendations, are underway to address the needs of survivors, to prevent future instances of the abuse of workers, to insure higher safety standards and to improve social compliance in Bangladesh’s ready-made garment industry.

UK government sought steps to avoid another factory disaster

The UK government has helped ratchet up standards in factories supplying UK retailers after the disaster in Bangladesh’s building complex. About 20 retailers, including Primark, were summoned to a UK government summit at the Department for International Development (DFID) as ministers sought steps to prevent another such incident. The meeting encouraged retailers to use their influence to help bring about change. The DFID also offered to provide social, political and economic insight to retailers to help them invest responsibly in developing countries. The UK has donated £18m (about $ 27.5 m) towards safety and skills training for Bangladeshi factory workers and is also offering technical support and advice on factory standards.

See more at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/jul/03/government-retailers-factory-disaster-bangladesh?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487

Australian retailer promises building safety checks in Bangladesh 

Despite not receiving any clothing from Rana Plaza, but relenting to pressure from human rights groups, Australian retail giant Kmart, is presently reviewing its commercial ties with Bangladesh. Kmart’s managing director has stated that the retail company will not tolerate underage employees or unsafe buildings.

See more at: http://www.voanews.com/content/austalia-retail-giant-promises-building-safety-checks-in-bangladesh/1694132.html

Bangladesh tells EU it will boost worker rights, inspections

In response to a “sustainability compact” launched by the EU, Bangladesh officials have pledged to enact a new labor law by the end of 2013, to boost worker rights and to increase the factory inspectorate by 200 staff to 800. This commitment is an effort to preserve European Union trade benefits. Bangladesh has been warned not to take these benefits for granted.  A group of mainly European retailers announced they had finalized a plan to promote worker safety through coordinated inspections.

See more at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/08/us-bangladesh-eu-idUSBRE9670P120130708

Major U.S. names missing as retailers sign deal to improve Bangladesh safety

75 mainly European retailers signed the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, backed by the international trade union IndustriALL and the Bangladeshi government. The accord is a legally binding plan to inspect garment supply factories in Bangladesh within nine months. In contrast, only three U.S. retailers have signed up to the plan. American firms are reportedly reluctant to join any industry accord that creates legally binding objectives.

See more at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/jul/08/retail-bangladesh-factories-improve-safety-deal

According to Jyrki Raina, the general secretary of the IndustriALL Global Union, a “profound change” was only possible with a strong coalition between trade unions, international brands and retailers and Bangladeshi authorities with worker involvement.

What else should foreign governments, multinational brands, trade unions, human right groups, and workers do? Read our 2013 ISSUE OF THE YEAR: Minimal standards for worker safety and Share your view.

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