In an article published in the New York Times on March 8, 2014, Edward Wong discussed recent comments the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi. On March 8th, Mr. Wang made comments that reflected the regional tensions between China and Japan. Mr. Wang noted that there would be no compromise on the issues of territory or history, direct references to China’s territorial dispute with Japan in the South China Sea as well as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent visit to the Yusukuni Shine, which honors Japanese war dead including a number of war criminals from WWII. Additionally, Wong discusses Mr. Wang’s comments that China was seeking to engage in negotiations in order to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea, but that China would “never accept unreasonable demands from smaller countries.” Finally, the article touches upon China’s commitment build a new model of relations between the U.S. and China, rather than simply maintaining a competitive relationship. An excerpt from the article is contained below. Click here to read the full article.
China’s Hard Line: ‘No Room for Compromise’
By Edward Wong
BEIJING — The Chinese foreign minister took a strong stand Saturday on China’s growing territorial disputes with neighboring nations, saying that “there is no room for compromise” with Japan and that China would “never accept unreasonable demands from smaller countries,” an apparent reference to Southeast Asian nations.
The foreign minister, Wang Yi, a former ambassador to Japan, made his comments at a news conference on the fourth day of the National People’s Congress, an annual meeting of China’s rubber-stamp legislature. Mr. Wang took questions from foreign and Chinese news organizations on the same morning he learned that a Malaysia Airlines flight bound for Beijinghad disappeared, and he spoke on a range of subjects that included Ukraine, the Korean Peninsula and relations between China and the United States. Mr. Wang stressed several times that China was committed to regional peace.
But Mr. Wang did not mince words on the subject of Japan and its prime minister, Shinzo Abe, who has angered Chinese leaders with recent public remarks on China-Japan relations and with a visit in December to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, where Japanese war dead are honored, including 14 Class A war criminals. In the East China Sea, China refuses to accept Japan’s administration of, or its claims to, islands that Japan calls the Senkaku and China calls the Diaoyu.
“On the two issues of principle — history and territory — there is no room for compromise,” Mr. Wang said in answer to a question from a Japanese reporter on the deterioration of China-Japan relations. “If some people in Japan insist on overturning the verdict on its past aggression, I don’t think the international community and all peace-loving people in the world will ever tolerate or condone that.”
Tensions between China and Japan have been playing out in diplomacy around the globe. In January, the Chinese ambassador to Britain and his Japanese counterpart both wrote op-ed articles for The Daily Telegraph in which they equated the other country to Lord Voldemort, the villain in the Harry Potter series. The two ambassadors even refused to sit at the same table during a televised BBC interview. Also in January, Mr. Abe told an audience at the Davos conference in Switzerland that the rivalry between China and Japan was similar to that between Germany and Britain before World War I, meaning their differences could supersede their close trade ties.
“I wish to emphasize that 2014 is not 1914, still less 1894,” Mr. Wang said Saturday. “Instead of using Germany before the First World War as an object lesson, why not use Germany after the Second World War as a role model?”
He added, “Only by making a clean break with the past and stop going back on one’s own words can the relationship emerge from the current impasse and have a future.”
In the South China Sea, China has been trying to stake sovereignty to islands and waters that are also claimed by Southeast Asian nations. Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia are among the opponents to China’s claims. The United States has said it takes no side on sovereignty issues but will maintain freedom of navigation. More recently, it has asserted that the so-called nine dashes map that some Chinese officials say defines China’s ambitious claims in the South China Sea violates international law because the territorial boundaries are not based on land features.
“As for China’s territorial and maritime disputes with some countries,” Mr. Wang said, “China would like to carry out equal-footing consultation and negotiation and properly handle by peaceful means on the basis of respecting historical facts and international law. There will not be any change to this position.”
“We will never bully smaller countries, yet we will never accept unreasonable demands from smaller countries,” he added.
As for relations with the United States, which is expected to remain the supreme military power in the Pacific for years to come, Mr. Wang said, “We stand ready to work with the United States to uphold peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. We believe the Asia-Pacific region should be the testing ground for our commitment to building a new model of major-power relations, and not a competitive arena.”
(BGF) – Recently, the Boston Global Forum was fortunate enough to interview Mark Robertson, the Head of Communications at Sedex Global. Sedex Global is a non-profit organization that works to enhance global supply chain transparency through audit information-sharing and collaboration between buyers and sellers. Following the recent tragedies in Bangladesh, supply chain issues, particularly in the context of worker safety and rights in the Ready Made Garment sector, have re-emerged at the forefront of international consciousness.
In response to the increased international scrutiny of safety issues in the garment sector, auditing of supply chains has become a widely recognized and publicized solution to concerns that governments, and major brands and retailers are sourcing from suppliers who operate in unsafe conditions. This concern has proven to be all too real for the United States Marine Corp and Walmart, who allegedly purchased goods from suppliers who utilized Tazreen Fashions Factory and Rana Plaza, respectively. Without absolving the major retailers, brands, governments, and others who source from suppliers who operate in questionable working conditions, a major issue is the increasingly complex web of global supply chains.
As Robertson noted, the scale and complexity of global supply chains presents a key issue for many companies: “Some of our members have as many as 20-30,000 suppliers globally, indirectly employing hundreds of thousands of people. So how do you put together a supply chain program that’s going to deal with that scale and complexity? So I think scale and complexity can be things that companies don’t necessarily know how to deal with and that’s often the starting point for Sedex’s work with them.” That level of complexity in global supply chains creates a scenario in which unauthorized sub-contracting can creep into a company’s supply chain, a well-known issues in Ready Made Garment sector.
Moreover, increased international scrutiny regarding supply chain sustainability has led to an emphasis on understanding the totality of a company’s impacts on worker safety and rights, whether those impacts are direct or indirect. Robertson noted that traditionally, companies might only assess their direct impacts as part of their corporate social responsibility programs. However, the more complex the supply chain, the more complex the impacts a company may have. Thus, a deeper understanding of a company’s global supply chain can further elucidate the impacts a company is having on worker safety and rights.
As a result, it is vital that companies, retailers, and brands map their supply chain and look as deeply as possible into who their suppliers are and who their suppliers work with. Complex global supply chains consist of multiple tiers of suppliers. The first tier supplier is likely to be in direct contact with the buyer (company, brand, retailer). Furthermore, that first tier retailer, as Robertson noted, may simply be an agent who then contracts that work out to other suppliers. When this is done transparently and the buyer is made aware of this arrangement then this does not present much of a difficulty, although it makes the supply chain increasingly complex. However, companies often do not look much further than their first tier supplier and are thus unaware of the work and safety conditions further down their supply chain.
Relatedly, Sedex’s research has shown that risks increase further down the supply chain, most likely because “…often the suppliers are smaller, they don’t necessarily have the tools, the resources, or the knowledge even to tackle these issues or they’re nearer to the risks.” Thus, by linking members who are buyers and members who are suppliers Sedex allows for collaboration, information-sharing, and transparency thereby illuminating supply chain risks across multiple tiers.
Given all of above, are audits the answer to improving worker safety and rights? Yes and no. According Robertson audits are “…play a vital role in highlighting where the risks are and identifying actions that need to be addressed. But it’s also important that companies look beyond simple compliance models and work toward best practice.” Thus, audits can play a significant role in illuminating risks in supply-chains and allowing brands and retailers to be “…more proactive and less reactive” in preventing future tragedies. However, audits alone are unlikely to be enough. Therefore, according to Robertson, it is important to couple capacity-building programs with the audit process.
Going forward, Robertson warns that we must not focus exclusively on the issues in Bangladesh, to the exclusion of issues occurring elsewhere. Certainly, the focus on Bangladesh is important, but it is not the only country hosting complex global supply chains. Furthermore, Robertson emphasizes that continued collaboration is necessary: “What about the risks that exist in other garment producing countries such as India, China, Pakistan, Turkey or Vietnam? We don’t need 50 new initiatives to tackle these issues, we need to see more people working together around them.” With the one year anniversary of the Rana Plaza collapse looming on the horizon, it remains to be seen whether the world can come together to prevent future tragedies in the complex global supply chains we all rely on.
Professor Patterson interviewing Joseph Nye during his BGF Distinguished Lecture.
On February 26, 2014 BGF was fortunate to have Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and a member of BGF’s Board of Thinkers, participate in the most recent installment of the BGF Distinguished Lecture Series. Professor Nye’s Distinguished Lecture launched BGF’s Issue of the Year for 2014, which is U.S., Chinese, and Japanese relations. During his Distinguished Lecture, Professor Nye touched upon the numerous aspects of the relationship and perceived competition between the U.S. and China, China’s soft and hard power strategies, the tensions between China and it’s Southeast Asian neighbors, the importance of a triangular relationship between the U.S., China, and Japan, and the prospects for the future of U.S., Chinese, and Japanese relations. The video of Professor Nye’s BGF Distinguished Lecture, as well as a briefing on his lecture, can be viewed on the BGF website. The transcription of Professor Nye’s Distinguished Lecture is provided below.
Professor Nye’s BGF Distinguished Lecture
Nye: It’s nice to be with you all at this meeting of the Boston Global Forum. I’m Joe Nye and I’m going to talk to you a little bit about the relations of the U.S., China, and Japan to start a conversation. My colleague Tom Patterson is going to raise some questions that have been brought in before on the Internet, so I’ll spend part of the time outlining the problem and part of the time having a chance to answer your questions.
Why focus on U.S., China, and Japan as a subject? Because it’s one of the issues which, if we mismanage, could make a real mess of our century. Some people have drawn analogies to 100 years ago. In 1914, Europe, which was at that time prosperous and had high degrees of economic interdependence, and where people were living quite good lives, Europe tore itself apart in World War I and ceased to be the center of world affairs as a result of WWI. And there is a danger, some people say, that the same thing could happen in terms of the relations between the U.S., China, and Japan. I don’t think that’s correct, but I’ll give you reasons why but, nonetheless, it is still an issue which has gotten a good deal of attention. There have been a number of books that have come out to commemorate the period after the end of the century anniversary of WWI which have brought forward this analogy to East Asia today. It was interesting that when Prime Minister Abe of Japan was at Davos at the World Economic Forum in January he raised the question of whether the relations between China, the U.S., and Japan were reminiscent of 1914. So, it’s I think a topic that’s worthy of our taking some time to think about.
Now, if I look at the problems of U.S., Japan, and China today I think that we might start with the argument that the Obama Administration has talked about a policy shift to spend more time thinking about Asia. It was originally called a “pivot to Asia” but then it became known as a “rebalancing toward Asia”. One of the questions that people raise is: is that really an appropriate terminology? After all the United States never really left Asia. The United States is a country which, geographically, one of our states is in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and Guam is closer to the Asian mainland than it is to North America. In addition to that, the United States is very heavily economically interdependent with Asian countries. Another thing that’s interesting, given the nature of American foreign policy, is that our foreign policy is very heavily influenced by the origins of where Americans come from. Originally Americans came more from Europe, but increasingly you’re seeing the influence of Asian-Americans in American politics. So, for a variety of reasons, geographic, economic, social, I don’t think you could say that the United States ever left Asia, or ever will. Nonetheless, there was a feeling in the first 10 years of the 21st Century that we were not paying enough attention to Asia. We became deeply involved after the attacks on 9/11 in Afghanistan and then in the invasion of Iraq, we became bogged down in the war in Iraq, and I think there was a feeling by many Americans, and which is captured by President Obama, that we had spent a lot of the first decade of the 21st Century thinking about some of the most difficult parts of the world and we were ignoring or neglecting the area which had become the center, or was becoming the center, of the world economy. I wrote a book a couple of years ago called The Future of Power and in that I said that one of the important power shifts of the 21st Century was from west to east. It was a power shift in which, the best way to understand it would be to think historically back to the year 1800. In 1800, if you looked at the world’s population and the world’s product, what was made, you’d see that more than half was in Asia: more than half the world’s population, more than half the world’s product. If you fast-forward that to 1900, you’d notice that Asia was still more than half the world’s population but it was now only 20% of the world’s product. And I think what you’re seeing is a long-term process in the latter part of the 20th Century and in this century, is what you might call a return to normal proportions. I would expect that by the end of this century Asia will be again more than half the world’s product as well as more than half the world’s population. This, I think overall, is a good thing. This might be called, not the rise of Asia, but the recovery of Asia to normal proportions. I think, in that sense, what it means is that hundreds of millions of people have been raised out of poverty, and we should all be grateful for that. It means a reduction of misery in the world and it’s a great accomplishment. It really starts to some extent in Japan, carries forward to Korea, and to some of the Southeast Asian nations now very much focused on China, and increasingly, I think, will be focused on India. It’s a process which, I think, has been good for the world, good for Asians, but good for the rest of the world as well.
But with that good news there are some people who say there may be bad news and the bad news argument goes something like this: Very often it is said that when you have a shift of power and the rise of a new power, right now much of the attention is focused on China, that this leads to instability and leads to the possibility of great conflict. This, of course, was the famous answer that the Greek historian Thucydides gave as to the origins of the Peloponnesian War, that it was caused by the rise in the power of Athens and the fear that created in Sparta, and many people transfer that to the origins of WWI that I mentioned a few minutes ago, arguing that it was caused by the rise in the power of Germany and the fear that created in Britain. And some are arguing that that will be the story of our century. That the rise in the power of China will create fear in the U.S. and in Japan, and that that could lead to another great conflict between countries. There are, as I say, some political scientists who say that this is the future.
I don’t believe that, myself. I think that analogy is wrong for several reasons. One is that, if you look at the story of 1914, you should notice that the situation of Germany in 1914 was that it had already passed Britain. In that sense, not only would the causes of WWI be much more complex than just the rise of Germany, there was also the rise of Russia and the decline of Austria-Hungary, and so-forth. The most important thing is that Germany was not only right on Britain’s heels but, in some dimensions, was passing Britain and that was creating a degree of anxiety. When we look at the 21st Century, while there has been an impressive rise in the power of China, I think if we look at all dimensions of power, we do not see a China that is going to be more powerful than the U.S. for quite some time, if ever.
How can I say that when everybody says of course China is going to be the bigger economy than the United States. Well, the reason I say it is that there are three dimensions of power: there is military power, there’s economic power, and there is what I’ve called soft power, the ability to get what you want through attraction and persuasion. Even when China, if it continues at it’s rapid growth rate and doesn’t face any bumps in the road to throw it off the road, even if China does become an overall larger economy than the United States in, let’s say, 10 or 15 years or so, that’s one aspect of economic power: the total size of the economy, which gives a certain amount of market power. But there is another aspect, which is the sophistication of the economy which is better judged by per capita product. And on that, on per capita income or per capita product, China, even when it becomes larger than the U.S. overall, won’t anything near the United States. Indeed, many economists say that if China continues to prosper and grow at the rate that it is now, it won’t be near the United States in per capita income until sometime in the middle of the century. That’s very different than, let’s say, the fact that Germany had passed Britain in industrial production by the year 1900, well before WWI. So, if we look at one of the dimensions of power, and we say “is China becoming more powerful than the U.S. economically?” Even when it has a larger economy, it won’t necessarily be more powerful than the U.S. in terms of per capita income, or overall economic power.
The second dimension of power that I mentioned, military power, China has been increasing its military expenditures, indeed, with double-digit expenditures on its military budget in recent years. The military budget has been growing more rapidly than the economy overall. And some people say this means that China will challenge the U.S. as a global military power. But again, I think if one does a careful assessment of the numbers they’ll see that China has a long way to go in military power before it comes anywhere near the United States. China has indeed purchased and refurbished a former Ukrainian aircraft carrier, which forms it’s first carrier, and plans to build some more. But, there’s a large difference between having a single carrier, mostly now in a training role, and having, let’s say, a dozen or even anywhere more than 5, 6 carrier battle task forces. But carriers aren’t the only thing to think about. If you look at the ability to project military power globally, China does not have that capacity. The United States is probably the only country in the world that has a truly global capacity to project military power. So, I think as people say that China is going to equal the U.S. in military power, I rather doubt it, and even if some day it comes close, it’ll be quite some time to come.
And then on the third dimension of power that I mentioned, soft power, the ability to get what your want through attraction or persuasion, China has been trying to increase its soft power. Indeed, in 2007, President Hu Jintao told the 17th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that China needed to invest more in its soft power. And China’s been spending billions of dollars to do that. You have the establishment of hundreds of Confucius institutes and classrooms to teach Chinese culture and language around the world, you have the efforts to transform Chinese Central Television, Xinhua News Agency into global news agencies like the BBC or CNN. There are a number of efforts that China has been making to increase its soft power and that’s a very smart strategy for China. If you are a country who’s hard power, your economic and military power, is increasing rapidly there’s a danger that you’re going to frighten your neighbors and that they’re going to form coalitions against you. But if you can combine attractiveness or soft power with your hard power you’re less likely to produce these kinds of coalitions that would make you seem threatening, that would be trying to balance your power. So, in that sense, I think the strategy that Hu Jintao outlined in 2007 and which President Xi Jinping has reiterated for this year, is a smart power strategy of combining hard and soft power.
The problem, I think, is whether China can implement that soft power strategy in the way it wants. And one of the difficulties there is a great deal of soft power from a country or from a society comes from its civil society. If you look at the United States, for example, a good deal of the soft power of the U.S. comes from its universities or from Hollywood and not from government actions. Very often government broadcasting, if it’s seen as propaganda, doesn’t really create much soft power. So the secret to creating soft power is to unleash your civil society, to allow the freedoms and encourage different groups to speak out, sometimes self-critically about the country, and that gives a degree of credibility which can emphasize the role and attractiveness of the society.
The other point that I think China has to come to terms with as it tries to increase its soft power is the issue of how it appears in the eyes of its neighbors. If China has policies in which it appears to be bullying to its neighbors, for example, about issues in the South China Sea, that makes it difficult to increase its soft power. For example, when China had problems with the Philippines over the so-called Scarborough Shoal China was able to use the hard power of its naval vessels to prevent the Philippines from having access to the fish in that shoal but it meant that there was resentment that was created in Manila. So, the question that China would have to face is that if it follows a strategy of using hard power in the South China Sea to get what it wants, is that going to undercut its efforts to develop soft power through Confucius institutes and broadcasts and other things in national capitals. So, there is still a difficulty for China in terms of developing its full soft power resources. If you look at recent polls that have been taken by the BBC or by the Pew Trust and so-forth you’ll see that China is having some difficulty increasing its soft power, particularly among its neighbors in Asia.
So, in that sense, I think the metaphor or the analogy in which people say that what’s going to happen in East Asia today is going to be like 1914 and there’s going to be a great conflict and that’s going to be caused by the rise in the power of China and the fear it creates in the United States, I think that’s greatly exaggerated. China is not in comparison to the U.S. where Germany was in comparison the Britain in 1914. So, that means that, in fact, there is much more time for the United States and China to manage their relationship. There is so much to be gained through cooperation in the U.S.-China relationship that the competition, which is bound to be there, doesn’t have to be the dominant strand of the relationship. If you think of the areas where China and the U.S. need to cooperate, for example, areas of climate change, areas of maintaining international monetary stability, areas like making sure that there are no global pandemics, these are things which can have extraordinarily powerful effects on all societies, America, China, and others but they can’t be solved by any country alone. These are not issues, these transnational issues, are not ones that can be managed by just having one country dictate to another; they have to be solved by cooperation.
So, for those reasons, first of all I don’t think China is passing the United States in overall power, and second, that there are great incentives for cooperation in the relationship, as well as the competition. I don’t think that these predictions that 2014 and after will be like 1914 are very adequate ways to think about it. Indeed, if you look at the American policy toward East Asia, and I was involved in this in the Clinton Administration in the 1990s, the general policy that was laid out in the Clinton period, and which has remained the American policy since there, has been to seek to integrate China into the world economy and to develop good relations between China and the U.S., and Japan and China so there is a triangle of good relations. In the 1990s, some people were arguing that, as China’s power was rising, the United States should try to contain China. My reaction, and other people in the Clinton Administration at the time, was that it would not be possible to contain China; that that Cold War terminology just didn’t make sense. First of all, China’s neighbors weren’t clear that they wanted to join an alliance to contain China. Secondly, if you did try to contain China, you would just cause resentment and you would essentially make for bad relations between China and the United States afterwards. So, the attitude that Clinton took was to say that we welcome China with an open hand and Clinton supported China’s joining the World Trade Organization. The United States allowed major trade with China, which was good for us and good for China, but certainly wasn’t anything like containment in the Cold War. The other thing, of course, is we have many, many Chinese students, 200,000 I think in the United States now. That again is very different from the Cold War containment where with the Soviet Union there were almost no such contacts. So, the attitude that Clinton took was to invite China to participate, to be a responsible power. Now, some people said: “yes, but suppose China does grow strong and becomes a bully? Then what do we do?” And the answer there was to say, if China becomes a bully then others are going to want to be protected from China. In that period, as the United States looked at the situation we said, let’s integrate China into the world economy but as an insurance policy, where we want to hedge our bets, lets make sure that we keep good relations with other countries and particularly we reaffirmed the U.S.-Japan security treaty and security alliance. Both Japan and the United States had asked: “how do we deal with this rise of China?” China, of course, was on its way to passing Japan from being the third to the second largest economy in the world. So Japan had to think about security, the U.S. had to think about security and at the same time we didn’t want to contain China, we wanted to integrate China. So, by reaffirming the U.S.-Japan security treaty and treating the U.S.-Japan alliance as a framework for stability, we were able to accomplish, in policy terms, integration plus an insurance policy in case things went wrong. It’s best illustrated, perhaps, by the fact that I remember being at a summit meeting in which President Clinton met President Jiang Zemin in 1995 and Jiang Zemin asked Clinton: “Do you want a strong China or not?” And Clinton said to him: “We have much more to fear from a weak China than a strong China.” And that was an invitation, essentially, to China to be a full participant. At the same time, in 1996, Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto of Japan signed a declaration in Tokyo which said that the U.S.-Japan alliance, rather than being a relic of the Cold War, was the basis of a framework for stability in East Asia for the post-Cold War world. So, those two statements, those two attitudes of the ‘90s in the Clinton Administration were carried forward by the Bush Administration and then by the Obama Administration as the basis for how America saw this relationship. Basically that by having a triangle of good relations between the U.S., China, and Japan was the framework for stability which would allow the East Asian economies to continue to grow and prosper in ways that benefitted all three countries, China, Japan, and the United States. So, that basically has been the framework for the policy that the United States has tried to encourage in terms of the relations between China, Japan, and the U.S.
Having said this, that that’s the framework, what could go wrong? One of the things that could possibly go wrong, not that leaders would want a war, but that something could happen in terms of miscalculations. Let me give you some examples from the current dispute that exists between Japan and China over what China calls the Diaoyu Islands and what Japan calls the Senkaku Islands. This is about 7 or 8 square kilometers of barren rocks that are islets in the East China Sea. But what we’re finding is that there’s incursions of ships and planes, which are challenging each other. And there’s always a danger that somebody is going to make a mistake and that things will get out of hand. Let me give you an example of—well let me first give you a little history then an example of how this can happen. In 1972, when The United States handed back Okinawa to Japan after World War II, The United States had controlled the Senkaku Diaoyu Islands as part of its control of Okinawa after the war. And when it returned the territory of Okinawa to Japan it included the islands as a part of the handover. And in that sense, Japan has had administrative control because the Americans had administrative control of the Islands. But it was a problem, because in China’s view this did not mean that Japan had sovereignty over the islands and yet Japan felt it did have sovereignty over the islands. So when Japan and China were trying to normalize their relationship in the aftermath of World War II, then Prime Minister Kakuie Tanaka of Japan and Chou En-lai of China met, and they were arranging this normalization. And Tanaka said to Chou En-lai, “What should we do about these islands?—These little islands in the East China sea?” And Chou En-lai, I think, made a very wise decision here. He said, “Let’s leave this off for other generations. If we try to solve this now, we’re not going to be able to solve our issue of normalization. Let’s put it off for future generations.” That was wise, because essentially it meant that for decades to come while Chinese ships would sail into the area and sometimes would be challenged by the Japanese, basically there was no instant which disrupted the relationship between the countries. And as late as 2008, China and Japan were able to sign an agreement on how on principle they could jointly exploit any oil and gas, which would be found in disputed waters. But this came to an end in 2010. What happened in 2010 is a Chinese fishing trawler bashed into a Japanese coast guard boat, not once but twice. And the Japanese arrested ship, captain and crew. And when they took them back to Japan, the Chinese protested. The Japanese then released the crew but not the captain, who they said had been drunk, disorderly, and deliberately bashed into the ship. China took offense to that, “If we allow you to put this captain on trial, it means we’re accepting your sovereignty and your legal system. So we refuse that.” And eventually this led to a dispute, which escalated to the point where China embargoed its exports of rare earths to Japan, which is a very serious measure. And those exports stopped for a couple of months even after Japan decided to send the captain of the trawler back to China.
The interesting point was that it had a negative effect on public opinion in both countries—increasing nationalism, increasing hostility toward the other country. That was the circumstance that was in place when in 2012, Prime Minister Noda of Japan at that time decided to purchase three of the islands—these little barren islands. And the reason he did that was that Governor Nishihara of Tokyo was going to use the money of the municipality of Tokyo to purchase the islands, and he going to do that to stir up trouble with China. So Prime Minister Noda basically was saying if the central government of Japan purchased the islands maybe we can prevent them being misused this way. China didn’t see it that way. China saw it as a disruption of the status quo by using government money, in their view, to nationalize the islands. And that led to anti-Japanese riots in China; to a decrease in trade between Japan and China in 2012. I was sent by Secretary of State Clinton at the time to talk to Chinese and Japanese leaders about the American interest here, which was to keep the situation calm and not to see this dispute escalate. A dispute between the second and third largest economies in the world would be bad for everybody.
What I was impressed with as we met the leaders of China and Japan, was that they did not want war. They didn’t want this to escalate, but the question was could they avoid any miscalculations that would get out of hand in the future. And there is something to remember in terms of, not only, the incident in 2010, where the trawler captain bashing into the Japanese coast guard ship was not something ordered by Beijing, but something, which once it happened in a climate of nationals, it became difficult to manage. But if you go back to the case where the analogy with 1914 might make some sense. Sometimes statesmen wind up being trapped by events, which are more or less accidents or miscalculations. And things then escalate beyond where you’d like them to be. So if you look at the situation in 1914, there’s a lot of economy interdependence between Germany and Britain and other European countries. But nobody would’ve predicted by the beginning of the year there would be a war. And the only country that wanted war was Austria, but the war that Austria wanted was a short war in the Balkans, which you might call it the third Balkan War. Of course, the net result of one event leading to another following after the assassination of an Austrian Arch Duke Sarajevo was that you had a four-year war, which killed 20 million people, and which led to the end of Europe being the center of world politics.
So miscalculations sometimes occur in human history. And if I look at the situation in East Asia today, the relations of U.S., Japan and China, I don’t think that’s going to happen. I think, in fact, there are strong enough interests, and strong enough interdependence between the three countries that war is not likely. But as we know, humans are fallible, human systems are fallible, and sometimes through miscalculations, we wind up in places where nobody initially intended to be. So I would summarize this description of the situation of the relations of U.S., China and Japan and East Asia today as one where in fact there’s a lot to be gained from cooperation. There are some dangers of miscalculations. I don’t expect that they’ll get out of hand. But unless we pay careful attention, there’s always risk of being taken by surprise. And that’s why on this 100th anniversary it is worth our attention to making sure we approve communications, avoid the dangers of letting nationalism get so strong that if a miscalculation occurs, political leaders feel their hands are tied. And that I think would be the moral of the story of what I’m talking about now, which is not that this is going to be a problem like the earlier conflict of the sort, but that unless we’re alert to some of the dangers of miscalculation we might wind up with a situation that nobody wants.
So those are my thoughts on the relationship of the three countries, why it’s important. Let me just say one word and concluding about other ways to get out of this. I’m thinking particularly now the Daioyu Senkaku Islands situation. I’ve written in a number of places and spoken, one way to do this would be for Japan—ideally for Japan and China, but I don’t think China would agree at this point—to declare the Senkaku Daioyu islands a marine ecological preserve, which would have no habitation, no military uses, and which would be devoted to the larger good of the area as a whole. No one would have to agree that this would a change of sovereignty of the islands. You could leave that issue for the future. And in that sense, what we should be looking for is to revive the wisdom of Chou En-lai and Kakuie Tanaka, which is to put this off for future generations. Or another way to think about it is if we have a pot on the front of the stove, which is threatening to boil over, we are going to find some formula like this marine ecological preserve to slide it to the back of the stove where it will merely simmer for, lets hope, for another four or five decades as it did after Chou En-lai and Tanaka made their wise decision in 1972. So those are my thoughts and let me just see if I can answer some of your questions. It’s my colleague and friend, Tom Patterson.
Tom Patterson: Hey, Joe. Thank you. Thanks for the wonderful remarks. I’m Tom Patterson. I’m a colleague of Joe here at the Harvard Kennedy School and one of the co-founders of the Boston Global Forum. And since the forum announced your talk, Joe, we’ve had dozens of questions for you that have come to us through the Internet and I’d like to ask you about some of them. Before I do that I’d like to ask you about one of my own. You talked about how China’s soft power is handicapped by its weak civil society. On the other hand, China has an enviable technology. It’s got money that we would love to have—we wish our fiscal health was China’s—and it’s using some of that money to spread its influence. We certainly did that after the second war. It was the main instrument of our soft power, the Marshall Plan a big and obvious example. And China is following that path in some ways. Yet in some parts of the world, it’s getting some resistance. We saw that with Myanmar, for example, and certainly some in Vietnam, and there are some suspicions of what Chia’s motives might be. How well do you think China is doing in using money as an instrument to soft power?
Joseph Nye: Well, China has a quite effective aid program in Africa and Latin America, which I think has increased its attractiveness in its soft power. It’s been less successful in its immediate region of Southeast Asia, or its relations with India, for example. Partly because of this issue of whether it appears threatening at the same time. If China wanted to be more successful in using its money in its own neighborhood, so to speak, it will have to figure out how to combine its hard power and soft power more effectively—what I call smart power, the ability to combine the two so that one doesn’t cancel the other out. But if you look at the public opinion polls that they’ve taken, the global public opinion polls, China does quite well in Africa, Latin America; less well in its own neighborhood, less well in Europe.
Tom Patterson: So the first question that we have from the Internet, I’ve actually cobbled together from a set of questions that were asked of us by students at Peking University. And the question is, “What can the Japanese do to reduce the tension resulting from the past, particularly Japanese aggression in World War II?”
Joe Nye: Well when we look back at the 1930s and how Japan treated its neighbors—China and Korea—it’s pretty awful. And I think that one of the important things is that Japan has to come to terms with the ‘30s and you do have that in something like the apology that Prime Minister [name inaudible] made in the 1990s or the statement that Chief Cabinet Minister Kono made in apologizing for the comfort women in Korea. And I think the danger is that there are some groups in Japan now who are saying, “We are tired of apologizing.” And I think the recent threats of reversing those statements would be very, very bad. Similarly the Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the Yasakuni Shrine, which honors war dead from all wars and ages, but nonetheless 14 classic war criminals from WWII, that’s very offensive to both China and Korea and I think it was unwise for the Prime Minister to visit the shrine. Indeed, the American government through Ambassador Kennedy expressed disappointment at the Japanese action. So we’ll have to hope that Japan maintains it’s apologies for a period which doesn’t represent Japan today. Japan today is not a militaristic society as it was in the ‘30s. And I think it’s important that the apologies of the ‘90s stay and stand in place. It is important that Japanese Prime Ministers not make people think back to the 1930s by visits to the Yasakuni Shrine.
Tom Patterson: So this is a related question, actually. It comes to us from someone in Tokyo. It’s basically a question about what Japan can do to reach out more fully to China.
Joe Nye: Well, I think fortunately the economic relations between Japan and China are good. There is a heavy relationship of trade. There are somestudents, Japanese students in China, and Chinese students in Japan. Those are far steps in the right direction. But if you can find some large gesture which would indicate that Japan was willing to take like the one I mentioned of declaring that the Senkaku’s would be a green ecological preserve, that would be a way of demonstrating that Japan really is a peaceful society today. It’s not your 1930s Japan. And so Japanese officials ought to be thinking of ways that they can demonstrate Japan’s peaceful intentions, not merely through exchanges, which are a good thing, but through seeing if there is some larger gesture, which can indicate this.
Tom Patterson: We have an Australian journalist who wrote to us on the topic you addressed, but on a dimension you didn’t talk about. He refers to the U.S. pivot to Asia. But he is wondering where in that pivot the Trans Pacific Partnership, the trade agreement that is being negotiated and is having some problems in Washington and at the negotiations table, where that sort of fits into this triangular relationship between China, Japan, and the United States.
Joe Nye: Well, TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership) started actually with small countries in Asia and the idea was started by the Bush Administration. The idea was to set a higher standard for trade agreements. So China had been accepted into the World Trade Organization, the Doha Round wasn’t making very rapid progress. The feeling was suppose some smaller countries were able to agree on higher standards for trade agreements. And then that gradually grew. And you found Japan willing you join, you found Mexico and Canada, which are America’s NAFTA partners, being interested. So that now TPP would include about 40 percent of world trade, if it’s finally agreed upon and passed. At one point China said, “Well this is an anti-Chinese measure.” That it’s trying to contain China. And the China realized that: no, the Americans have said, in principle, if the Chinese can agree to the higher standards, China could join too. And so there has been some expression of interest in China as well. I don’t think this would happen right away, but if you ask over a longer-term future, it’s possible. It would be a very significant development.
Tom Patterson: Well there was even some talk this week about the next meetings taking place in China. That would speak to that point. Now, here’s a question that comes from a Vietnamese national, talking about that part of Asia. What role can the ASEAN countries play in the relationship between the 3 big powers?
Joe Nye: Well I think the ASEAN countries have been very successful by creating a degree of unity. Having these countries work together means that there is a sense of solidarity. They develop some soft power. And I think that if a country is being difficult towards one of these countries, the fact that it might offend all the other countries as well, means that there is incentive for good behavior. In 2002, China talked about the idea of developing a code of conduct for the settlement disputes about the South China Sea. Unfortunately that wasn’t adequately developed. I think China would be wise to go back to that idea of working with ASEAN as a group to develop a code of conduct. China tends to want to work with each of the small countries independently on the grounds that a big country like China will have more leverage with one small country. In one sense that’s true, but in another sense it’s not for the reasons I said earlier, because it makes China look threatening. But if China were willing to deal with the ASEAN countries as a group, that would make China look less threatening and would enhance ASEAN’s soft power, but also China’s soft power. Developing soft power is not a zero-sum game. You can have an increase in soft power by both China and ASEAN, which is a win-win situation.
Tom Patterson: We haven’t talked much about Korea. The next question is on that topic. Where does Korea fit in this relationship between Japan, China and the United States?
Joe Nye: Well, Korea, of course, is one of the great success stories of this recovery of Asia. If you look at Korea in 1960, it had the same per capita income as Ghana. Today Korea is a member of the OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It not only has had dramatic economic progress, but it’s also has had dramatic political progress. No longer an authoritarian country, but a country in which elections lead to real changes in government. So I think Korea is a great success story and is a model, which other countries in the future can look to as one hopeful path for the future.
Unfortunately right now, the relations between Korea and Japan are not very good and partly goes to this issue of nationalism and the sense of resentment about threats that Japan might change statements like the Kono statement on comfort women or things like the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. I think it would make a lot of sense for Korea and Japan to repair their relationship if for no other reason than the fact that both of them have to ask what happens if something goes wrong in North Korea. And given the instability, the unpredictability of the North Korean regime the bad relations between Japan and South Korea is not something that either of them can afford.
Tom Patterson: One last question and fittingly, perhaps, it’s from a Kennedy School Student. Better get this one right. It is said that China’s foreign policy reflects what it’s trying to achieve in its internal affairs. Does that insight provide any leverage in thinking about what China is likely to do in the specific region?
Joe Nye: I think it does help. If China were an aggressive country trying to take over other countries—remember, going back to this 1914 analogy: Germany was seeking colonies in Africa, so forth—If China were focused outside then one might be more worried. But China’s major concern now is economic development. And they regard economic development as essential, not only because despite their impressive progress large parts of the countries are still very underdeveloped, the south, the west and so forth, but they’re concerned about keeping the legitimacy of the communist party rule. And the legitimacy of the communist party rule has largely profited from this very high rate of economic development. So a loss of economic development, or a failure in economic development would be very bad for China’s objectives. So in that sense, the fact that China is focused on internal conditions, economic development, and political stability, is a good thing. Now that doesn’t mean that China couldn’t make mistakes. As I’ve indicated in my talk, you could still have a foolish policy over some small, uninhabited island in the East China Sea or the South China Sea. But by and large, when my colleagues and I visited Beijing in 2012, what one of the top leaders said to us was, “We need 30 years of peace, and stability and economic development if we’re going to succeed.” That’s a hopeful sign.
Tom Patterson: Joe, Thank you very much. On behalf of Boston Global Forum, this was the opening bell of a yearlong look of the relationship between China, Japan and the United States. That important relationship and what it might pertain not only for those three countries, but for the region and the world. As Governor Dukakis announced in his opening statements, we’ll be holding three conferences over the course of the year. And on our website, Bostonglobalforum.com, we’ll be posting materials related to this discussion and invite you to continue to provide us questions and we’ll do our best over the course of the year to try to address them. Thank you.
(BGF) – On February 26, 2014 Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and a member of the Boston Global Forum’s Board of Thinkers, participated in the latest installment of the BGF Distinguished Lecture Series. Professor Nye’s Distinguished Lecture commenced BGF’s Topic of the Year for 2014, which is the relationship between the United States, China, and Japan. In the lecture Professor Nye addressed numerous topics related to U.S.-Chinese-Japanese relations, placing a particular focus on the common comparison between current U.S., Chinese relations and pre-WWI relations between Germany and Britain.
As Professor Nye argued, the comparison of 1914 relations between Germany and Britain and current relations between the U.S. and China is premised upon the assertion that China will soon surpass the U.S. economically. As he noted, Germany was a rising power in the early 20th Century and was already beginning to surpass Britain in terms of economic power. The rapid increase in Germany’s power stoked fears in Britain, thereby increasing tensions and ultimately resulting in the onset of WWI. Many political scientists paint a similar picture of current U.S., Chinese relations. China, they note, is a rapidly rising economic power which will soon surpass the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy. According to this line of argument, China’s rapid rise will raise fears in the U.S. regarding China’s power, similar to the fears in Britain in 1914, thus resulting in the outbreak of war, as occurred in the early 20th Century.
While this view is prevalent, Professor Nye was quick to note it is flawed and that any threat of war posed by the rapid rise of China is greatly exaggerated. There are a number of reasons for this, which Professor Nye carefully laid out throughout his Distinguished Lecture. Firstly, while China is experiencing impressive, rapid economic growth, the sheer size of it’s economy alone is not a definitive indication of it’s economic power. Of course, the overall size of an economy gives an indication of it’s market power, but it does not capture the sophistication of the economy. Rather, Professor Nye suggests that we assess economic strength through the lens of per capita income. Using per capita income as the metric, it quickly becomes clear that China will only begin to approach the economic power of the U.S. by the middle of the 21st Century.
Additionally, Professor Nye noted that there is more to power than simply economic power. Power is comprised of hard power, which is made up of a country’s military power and economic power, and soft power, which is a country’s ability to “get what it wants through attraction or persuasion”. In terms of military power, China has spent significant amounts of money in order to bolster its military power, including purchasing and refurbishing a former Ukrainian aircraft carrier. However, in practical terms, China only has one carrier, which is primarily utilized in a training role. What is more, China lacks the ability to project its military power globally.
In terms of it’s soft power, China has made significant efforts to expand the reach of Chinese culture through the establishment of Confucius institutes and efforts to transform it’s media outlets into global news sources similar to the BBC or CNN. Professor Nye notes that China’s emphasis on soft power is a smart strategy. Rapid growth in a country’s power can lead it’s neighbors to form alliances in an effort to rebalance the power structure. But, by increasing it’s soft power, China can allay such fears amongst its neighbors. Yet, China faces difficulties in terms of the efforts to expand its soft power. The primary issue is that much of a country’s soft power stems from its civil society. This is exemplified by the U.S., who attains much of its soft power through its universities and through Hollywood. Thus, a free civil society is crucial to any effort to expand soft power.
Another issue facing China’s efforts to expand its soft power is the way in which it is perceived by its neighbors. Consequently, Professor Nye notes that it would be in China’s best interest not to utilize hard power in it’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea, particularly the dispute over a set of uninhabited islets that China calls the Diaoyu Islands and Japan calls the Senkaku Islands. The use of hard power in this dispute would only serve to fuel a perception amongst China’s neighbors that China is a bully, thereby undercutting it’s efforts project it’s soft power.
Given that the claims alleging that China will surpass the power of the United States appear to be exaggerated, Professor Nye emphasized the importance of collaboration between the U.S., China, and Japan. Since China will only truly challenge the U.S.’s economic power by the middle of the 21st Century, it is clear that the U.S. and China have time to continue to work on their relationship, an opportunity that Britain and Germany lacked in 1914. Moreover, building on the policy precedent set by the Clinton Administration during the 1990s, it is crucial to foster an inclusive environment for China so that it can participate and be a responsible actor on the global stage. Moreover, a strong relationship between the U.S. and Japan is a key component in the efforts to ensure stability in an environment that is inclusive of China
As Professor Nye argued, “There is so much to be gained through cooperation in the U.S.-China relationship that the competition, which is bound to be there, doesn’t have to be the dominant strand of the relationship.” Therefore, the key takeaway from Professor Nye’s Distinguished Lecture appears to be that cooperation and strong ties between the U.S., China, and Japan, rather than merely competition, are the order of the day.
The Boston Global Forum (BGF) was fortunate enough to be able to speak with Mark Robertson, the Head of Communications at Sedex Global. As Mr. Robertson outlines below, Sedex Global is a non-profit organization that aims to enhance global supply chain transparency through audit-information sharing and collaboration between buyers and sellers. The following is the interview transcription containing information on Sedex Global, global supply chain transparency, the challenges of audits in the Ready Made Garment Sector, and the importance and relevance of supply chain transparency and audits for worker safety and rights.
Mark Robertson: Sedex is a global, not-for-profit organization. This is actually our tenth anniversary year. Basically we were set up ten years ago around a simple aim and that was basically, to address duplication in supply-chains. So the initial aim was around ensuring that, basically, buyers were experiencing difficulties in that they were being asked to be audited many times by their customers. For some suppliers that could mean responding to thirty or forty audit requests a year, for example, often from a similar set of customers all looking for similar types of assurances. So, Sedex was originally set up to tackle duplication in the supply-chains, so that was really about looking at how can we create a system globally to enable a supplier to go through the audit process once and then share that information about their ethical or responsible sustainability performance with multiple customers at the same time. So Sedex was, in its first incarnation, set up as an information exchange, if you like, a better way of connecting buyers with suppliers and suppliers with buyers. Uniquely, it was actually instigated by suppliers almost from a bottom-up approach. So rather than the traditional top-down “we’re a global brand and we want to look down our global supply-chain”, that was part of the process. In helping brands to do that we were looking at what needs to happen from the top-down but also from the bottom-up. So that’s kind of what Sedex was set-up to do. The way Sedex works is buyers and suppliers join as members. Globally now we have over 33,000 buyer and supplier members and they span 25 different industry sectors and over 125 different countries, so we operate in different parts of the world and different regions. We’re headquartered in the U.K., we have an office, in the U.S. and in China, representatives in Latin America and also throughout Europe as well. In terms of our membership we have three categories of members. We have buyers, so they are all of the worlds big, global brands are Sedex members. They join to track, manage, and respond to risks in their supply-chain and we probably have about 4-500 of them. Then we have people who kind of sit in between, so they are a buyer and a supplier. They could be a very large company like PepsiCo who is supplying into supermarkets, Walmart, whoever, but equally they have a very complex supply-chain in their own right. Then we have the vast majority of our members who are suppliers. In essence, the way it works is, from a buyer perspective they join Sedex, we help them map out their supply-chain, they see which suppliers are already on Sedex, if they’re not they reach out to the suppliers or we do that for them or they do that themselves. In joining, when their suppliers come aboard to Sedex they go through a self-assessment questionnaire, and then they go through a risk-profiling tool and if that throws up concerns the buyer will then commission an audit on that supplier. If their supplier is already on Sedex then the likelihood is they’ve already been audited and that’s where the efficiency comes in. That’s the broad sense, or the core part, of what we do, but we do many other things as well. We are a team of 50 people, we do a lot of work around publications, light advocacy work, we have a stakeholder engagement team so we’re constantly working with stakeholders from the U.N. Global Compact through to government agencies around the world, regulatory bodies, and that’s about sharing our expertise on global sourcing and responsible sourcing issues, but also about sucking in intelligence to make what we do more effective. So, that’s a bit of background about us. It’s interesting actually, we’re gearing up for our 10th anniversary event and we have a members forum every April and this year we’re celebrating our 10th birthday. We’re collecting thoughts from some of our members on that and somebody said, “Sedex is a cool idea, if it didn’t exist, you’d invent it” and I think that kind of sums up quite nicely the essence of elements of what we do. So that’s a bit of background on us and as I’m talking through the questions let me know if there’s other bits that don’t quite make sense.
Boston Global Forum (BGF): Okay, based on that background actually transitions pretty well into the first question. So, Sedex provides tools that help companies pre-screen, manage, engage, and audit their supply-chains. However, sub-contracting is a key issue, particularly in the garment industry in Bangladesh. How do your tools/services handle the issue of sub-contracting within global supply-chains?
Mr. Robertson: That’s an interesting challenge and question. So, basically, a unique part of what we do is around multi-tier supply-chain transparency. The way Sedex as a system tackles that issue is by enabling buyers to go beyond the first tier of their supply-chain. What that means in practice is, if I’m a clothing retailer and I’m sourcing from Bangladesh, Viet Nam, China, Pakistan, you name it, then I can use Sedex to reach out to the first tier supplier, so that could be an agent and then I would encourage them to join Sedex if they weren’t already a member and link to them. Then I can send a signal for them to tell me who their suppliers are and then so on and so on and so on. So the way Sedex works is, it enables the linkages between buyers and suppliers but beyond the first tier, if that makes sense. So I would make say to my first tier supplier, who often is an agent so they’re not making anything, they’re just fielding work and say “who are you using and where are they? And are they a Sedex member?” Then they would link to the underlying supplier and that supplier could link to their underlying supplier and so on and so on. And, actually, without sounding too promotional, that’s quite a unique element of the Sedex system. We’ve done research quite recently that shows, basically the way Sedex works is it’s a mechanism, amongst other things, for sharing audits, it means we sit on a huge, global pot of data, thousands and thousands of audits that can often act as a global barometer as to where standards are at. You imagine lots of audits being shared looking at lots of issues, so we can see what the issues are, how often the audit non-compliances occur and how long it takes them to be closed off and all those kinds of issues. But what we found is, in relation to your question, that the further you look down the supply-chain generally the risks increase. So, if you move beyond one supplier, and you can imagine why, its because often the suppliers are smaller, they don’t necessarily have the tools, the resources, or the knowledge even to tackle these issues or they’re nearer to the risks. So that’s how Sedex works. It’s really about cascading information down the supply-chain and being able to link suppliers together beyond the first tier. So that’s how we handle it I guess, if that answers your question.
BGF: Yeah, fantastic. So basically you’re shining a light a lot further down the supply-chain than previously had been done in a lot of instances that way you can see and unravel where the sub-contracting would be occurring and get deeper into where the risk might be.
Mr. Robertson: Yeah, and it’s not perfect but it gets you that bit nearer to where the risks are. Alongside that, the other kind of thing that we do as well is we run various programs and initiatives to push best practices in auditing. We have something called SMETA [Sedex Members Ethical Trade Audit], which is a Sedex Audit Methodology, one of the most commonly used globally now. Within it that we highlight the needs to go beyond tier-one suppliers, we have working groups of auditors around the world now that we convene to share best practices, so there are various things that we do as an organization, not only to facilitate the technical aspects of how to get beyond tier-one and deal with issues of sub-contracting, but around developing best practice guidance as well. That’s your working groups, SMETA, and the publications that we produce as well.
BGF: Kind of building off of that, what in your experiences, or Sedex’s experience, are the most common issues and trends that prevent individuals and companies from fully understanding or recognizing the safety issues in their supply-chains?
Mr. Robertson: I think sometimes it’s a lack of knowledge. Are you talking from a buyer’s perspective, from a supplier’s perspective, or both?
BGF: Probably more from a buyer’s perspective, but I think both would be relevant.
Mr. Robertson: I think, firstly, almost cultural differences. So, for example, in the States, and correct me if I’m wrong, but from our perspective understanding and concerns around environmental issues in the supply-chain are something that gets slightly more widely acknowledged whereas ethical and social issues perhaps aren’t always as readily embraced, or haven’t been anyways, by companies in the U.S. Whereas in Europe, that’s been slightly different. Even within Europe there are different issues that are of more concern to some companies, so there are certainly cultural differences. I think sometimes there’s also, when companies start to look at this, they don’t know where to start because I think the issue of scale is often under-appreciated by companies. Some of our members, they talk about working with 20-30,000 suppliers globally indirectly employing hundreds of thousands of people. So how on Earth do you put together a supply-chain program that’s going to deal with that scale and complexity? So I think scale and complexity are often things that companies don’t necessarily know how to deal with. I think sometimes, perhaps traditionally as part of their CSR approach have focused primarily on their direct impacts but I think there’s a growing amount of pressure now internationally for companies to look more at their indirect impacts through their supply-chain. Often that is more around environmental sustainability issues but increasingly there is pressure for companies to look far beyond that. So, I think it’s a combination of cultural approaches, not necessarily knowing how and where to approach the issues, how to deal with issues like complexity, how to get beyond tier-one.
BGF: The next question I have is that critics often raise the concern that safety audits are ineffective given that factory owners can often hide violations on the audits giving the false impression of compliance. When Sedex is helping out with audits are there any measures that can be put in place to ensure that violations do not remain hidden from auditors?
Mr. Robertson: Yeah, always a problem, things like double bookkeeping or going through to misunderstandings culturally depending on what part of the world you’re looking at. Again, it’s an issue. The kind of thing that we do to tackle that are around the training, and awareness, and capability building programs I was talking about. So we have something called the Associate Auditors Group which started off as a U.K. working group comprised of global audit companies, individual auditors as well, we also have NGOs who sit on that group, and of course buyer and supplier representatives as well. The group, we have a U.K.-based group but we’re also establishing groups in China and Latin America as well. Basically, that’s about looking at auditing challenges generally and coming up with a better way to do things in particular around transparency and pushing those kinds of agendas. So we do that. SMETA, which is the audit methodology I was telling you about, has particular guidance on that very issue as well. I suppose we’re doing more of it as well, we’re constantly looking at how we develop the Sedex system and the resources we provide as well. The other kinds of things we’re looking at are more resources for suppliers to help them appreciate the benefits of a more ethical way of doing business, you know the business benefits of responsible sourcing. That said, audits aren’t perfect but there are things that you can do to make them more effective as a tool. I suppose the things I’ve just listed out are resources we’ve put in place as well. It’s really about going beyond compliance and looking at the other issues, how do you work with suppliers to increase their capacity and get them onboard with responsible sourcing? Well, audits can flag the issues you need to look at but you need focus on things like training, capacity building programs, and all that kind of stuff.
BGF: Building off of that as well, I was reading in some of Sedex’s research that workers’ organizations, particularly women’s organizations, are marginalized in the Garment Industry audits in Bangladesh. Do your capacity building programs focus on ensuring that workers’ and women’s organizations are not marginalized during audits in the Ready Made Garment sector?
Mr. Robertson: That’s quite a big issue to tackle. One of the things we do is when a supplier comes onto Sedex they initially go through a self-assessment questionnaire and that’s a key process. Within that we do track gender specific data, so we look at gender split for example. So that enables that supplier’s customers to understand what the gender split is there and whether or not there are issues stemming from that. We also look at seasonality, which is relevant to particular industries or sectors. For example, tea pickers in the tea trade are often women and so seasonality data and employment rates enables buyers to focus their attentions on programs they have around gender equality and gender issues to focus their attentions at the right time. Generally, what we also do through SMETA and our Supplier Workbook is flag the issues that may or may not be relevant within any given sector and we do look at women’s rights and gender related challenges in supply-chains as part of that as well. So we provide guidance. It’s really about looking at that issue within the context of other issues and thinking about the data you need to focus your attention. Again, the challenge you have if you’re a medium to large-scale global business is the scale and complexity of your supply-chain. What you have to have in place first is the right understanding and the transparency you need to understand who’s employed, how they’re employed, and when they’re employed. Then you can start focusing on the issues you need to hone in on.
BGF: One finding that I found particularly interesting in some of Sedex’s research as well was that there isn’t as much variation in fire safety non-compliance between different sectors and industries as one might expect. Given this finding, that there’s not much variation in fire safety non-compliance between industries and sectors why do you think fires in the garment industry, in particular, receive so much attention when there are almost equally as many instances of violations and non-compliance in other industries and sectors?
Mr. Robertson: I think there are a number of reasons. I think the severity of fire safety hazards varies, obviously. There are all sorts of ways to answer that question. Firstly, there’s the fact that the garment sector often involves countries that are developing economies, or frontier economies, so obviously you’ve got Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Viet Nam. You often find that in those countries the garment sector, or the clothing trade, is often one of the first industries to go in. So, often the kinds of challenges or level of industrialization that is encountered, it’s kind of early stage. The very nature of the clothing sector is that the risks are high. The way in which, if you think about the factories involved and the way clothes are manufactured and made, then fire safety is a particularly relevant and critical risk. And when things do go wrong, you’re often talking about hundreds and hundreds of people working in a factory, in cramped conditions, with lots of material around, you know fires can very quickly take hold and if the right safeguards aren’t in place, very quickly turn to a loss of life. Of course, that can be the same in other factories in other sectors but I think the risks are particularly high in the garment sector. Also, other things such as media scrutiny and NGO awareness has all helped to shine a spotlight on the global garment trade as well. So there are a number of factors that have come into play. I think it’s a combination of factors but really, critically fire safety risks are particularly high in the garment sector. I think that’s why, quite rightly, it’s received a lot of scrutiny. Also, to be honest, high-profile tragedies have helped to raise awareness.
BGF: Well, in the wake of the recent tragedies in Bangladesh that really pushed the garment industry back into the forefront of international consciousness, as I’m sure you’re aware, the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety and the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety have both sprung up. Their purpose are quite similar, in a way, to Sedex’s purpose which is to create a common standard so that the garment industry isn’t necessarily dealing with so many differing audits and standards that they have to cope with, which seems pretty similar to what Sedex is trying to do, trying to minimize the duplication of the audit procedure. So, given that similarity, does Sedex have any advice for the Alliance and the Accord in their efforts to increase safety in their supply chains?
Mr. Robertson: Again, I suppose this is where I might want to give you a more considered response, but a first stab at answering that is, so are you talking about the next question as well, which is: is it important to have a common set of standards? Or do you want me to answer that separately as well?
BGF: You can answer that as part of this as well because I think they’re related.
Mr. Robertson: Yeah, I think they are. Obviously, the Accord and the Alliance are slightly different in their approach and the commitments they place on signatories, but a good example of collaboration and action. There’s lots of ways in which buyers and suppliers can collaborate together but the Alliance and the Accord are a good example of retailers being mobilized around Bangladesh, in particular. I think one concern that I would have on that is that’s great on one level but do we need an Accord and an Alliance for the world, globally. Is there a risk that too much attention is being focused on Bangladesh at the expense of other areas? So I think, perhaps kneejerk isn’t the right term, but it’s important that we use this as an opportunity to get a better understanding of risks globally, not just in Bangladesh. Standardization, or having a common set of standards, reducing duplication, obviously is great because it introduces efficiency. All workers in all sectors deserve a basic standard of health and safety and deserve the right to work in safe environments. I think if you are talking about a common set of standards it’s important that these introduce the efficiencies that you want them to but that they can also bend and flex to meet the requirements in different sectors and industries as well. I think standardization is good but it’s important that there are mechanisms to enable different standards to be used as well. I don’t think you’re ever going to get to a point where one overall audit approach is going to cover absolutely every single issue. What you do need are good ways of sharing that information and creating efficiencies and getting buyers and suppliers working together. To a certain extent, yes, it’s very important [to have a common set of standards], and that’s certainly what we’re working towards, but you also need ways for other types of information to be shared and for other standards to be used more appropriate as well.
BGF: So, as Sedex noted in its Fire Safety Briefing the Ready Made Garment industry is a powerful economic force in Bangladesh. What steps do you recommend companies take when implementing changes or improvements based on audit findings so that workers who rely on the industry are not harmed in the process?
Mr. Robertson: I am not quite sure what you mean there.
BGF: Okay, what I am trying to get at is, based on audit findings companies will pull out of a particular factory. But there will be potentially hundreds of workers who rely on that factory for their employment. So pulling out that factory, for example, might just result in mass unemployment for the people who were depending on that job, thereby harming the people that we’re trying to help. So, I was wondering if Sedex takes note of that, and if there are any recommendations that Sedex makes to companies so that when they’re implementing changes based on audit findings they don’t just have a quick, rash reaction that actually does more harm to the people than maybe a more considered reaction might?
Mr. Robertson: Yeah, that’s interesting. I suppose we wouldn’t as an organization necessarily make recommendations on that basis because that’s not quite the way we work. Having said that though, our members forum that I was telling you about at the beginning of the conversation, that’s one of the issues we’ll probably be looking at, I would’ve thought within the context of the things we’ll be discussing during the day. I suppose based on our membership and using Bangladesh as an example, or the other things that have happened, there are different ways in which members would choose to react to that. Some may decide that, rather than moving out of an area where standards are questionable or where there’s been some kind of supply-chain disaster, be it a factory collapse or a fire or whatever, the best thing to do is to take their business elsewhere. Others would decide that’s not necessarily appropriate and they want to remain and improve standards. I think there are different ways of looking at both approaches. So, yes you could argue that it’s better to stay put and drive improvements as much as you can. I think it’s important to appreciate the factors which contribute to problems in different parts of the world. So, they can be things that are within the control of a buyer to consider but often not. I mean, if you look at building safety in Bangladesh, for example, or the context of the factory collapse. Obviously it was a poorly built building but the way in which factories have evolved and developed, you have mixed-use buildings, you have a lack of building codes which contributed, you have the fact that certain buildings have been built on improper foundations, you have corruption, you have bribery, you have lack of enforcement of local regulations, as well as sometimes not being careful enough to think about where you’re sourcing from as well. So, I suppose what I’m saying in a very roundabout way is, I don’t mean necessarily Bangladesh here, but removing your business from one part of the world or one region, sometimes people do do that because they cannot be confident or they cannot be certain that their basic requirements have been met. So, while it sometimes might look like you’re taking the easy option, actually sometimes it isn’t. I think often it’s quite a considered decision. If you really cannot be certain that even the most basic requirements or elements of your responsible sourcing policy are being met and you’re not even confident that you can work to get them there, do you stay or not? It’s an interesting question I guess. Likewise, in other parts of the world or other sectors, other members or other companies would decide that actually they do see worth in collaborating and driving standards. You do see two approaches but I think the context of both sometimes, you have to look at the wider picture I think.
BGF: Yeah, it’d be quite context specific.
Mr. Robertson: Yeah, I think so. You know, you’ve got to think about the impacts that you can have as well. Another advantage of the Sedex model is that by working with Sedex, as a buyer in particular, you’re working towards a common set of standards, you’re working towards a common set of goals and it means that suppliers aren’t getting as many mixed messages and it’s creating coherence. So I think there’s those kind of advantages in working via our platform.
BGF: Excellent. I just have one final wrap up question that will leave room for some final comments. What do you see as being some of the biggest challenges facing audits and monitoring in the Ready Made Garment Industry?
Mr. Robertson: That’s a big challenge. Firstly, I think a big challenge is being more proactive and less reactive. Obviously, it’s great to see so much effort and focus on Bangladesh, but what about the supply-chains in other garment producing countries? I think the challenge is really making sure that we are getting multi-tier supply-chain transparency so that we are looking beyond first-tier suppliers to properly get to grips with risks that exist further down the supply-chain. I think creating consistency and convergence is really important. We don’t need 50 new initiatives to tackle these issues, we need to see more people working together around them. Also, I think, perhaps being a bit more long-term in our thinking, sustainability challenges as well. Cotton, for example, you have sustainability pressures around the availability of raw materials, water scarcity, labor standards, security of the supply-chain, security of the workforce, there are a whole myriad of different risks that exist whether you look through an environmental focus or a social focus as well. Of course, globalization can quickly create new challenges and new patterns of trade so companies source from different parts of the world and their supply-chains can shift quite quickly sometimes, so I think it’s keeping track of that as well.
BGF: Fantastic, that sounds excellent. I really appreciate you taking the time to talk with me today. Your comments have been extremely enlightening and really helped clarified some of my thinking on this.
(BGF) – On February 11, 2014 the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (“the Committee”) held a hearing on the “Prospects for Democratic Reconciliation and Workers’ Rights in Bangladesh”. The hearing consisted of two panels. The first panel was composed of testimony from Nisha Desai Biswal, the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs; Eric Biel, the Acting Associate Deputy Undersecretary for International Affairs at the Bureau of International Labor Affairs in the U.S. Department of Labor; and Lewis Karesh, the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Labor.
The second panel was comprised of testimony from Ellen Tauscher, the Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety; Scott Nova, the Executive Director of the Workers Rights Consortium who is a Witness Signatory to the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh; and Kalpona Akter, the Executive Director for the Bangladesh Center for Worker Solidarity.
Much of the discussion during the first panel centered around the U.S. role in promoting democracy and the improvement of worker safety and rights in Bangladesh. In particular, the Committee was concerned with further clarifying the U.S.’s overall strategy in Bangladesh, as well as whether U.S. efforts, and the impact of the suspension of the Generalized System of Preferences benefits for Bangladeshi goods were effective. However, two more subtle points were made during the first panel that are of particular interest.
Firstly, Senator Menendez, the Chairman of the Committee, noted that the efforts to improve worker safety and rights in Bangladesh must send a signal to brands, retailers, and the rest of the world that sub-standard work conditions will not be tolerated, in Bangladesh and beyond. This is a critical reminder that we must not forget that worker safety and rights are problems that exist in many countries. As Senator Menendez made clear, we must send a message that brands and retailers cannot sidestep the issue of improving worker safety and rights by simply leaving Bangladesh in favor of a country with less stringent standards.
Secondly, workers are their own best advocates. This echoes a sentiment that was expressed frequently during our November 18th, 2013 online conference on worker safety and rights. As has been widely noted, the workers of Rana Plaza were aware that the building was unsafe, however, because they were threatened with termination or docked pay, and because they lacked the ability to organize, they were forced to work in unsafe conditions. Consequently, if workers are given more rights, especially the right to organize, then they will be able to voice concerns and pressure employers for better work conditions. After all, who knows the work conditions better than the workers?
The second panel, which featured representatives for both the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety and Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, as well as Ms. Akter who was once a Bangladeshi child laborer, primarily focused on the similarities and differences between the Alliance and Accord. Moments of tension during the Q&A portion of the hearing abounded, as Ms. Akter and Senator Menendez implied a preference for the Accord. This put Ms. Tauscher on the defense as she sought to downplay the differences between the two industry-led initiatives.
In particular, Ms. Tauscher noted that the the Alliance and Accord have worked together closely on a set of standards. As she noted, having two sets of standards would be the only thing worse than having no set of standards at all, a realization that prompted coordination between the two initiatives. Additionally, she sought to combat the misrepresentation of the Alliance in the media and public opinion. Her testimony stated: “…there has been considerable misinformation about the perceived differences between the Alliance and the Accord and too little said about what we have in common and where we can collaborate. The member companies and other stakeholders of both initiatives share a common purpose: to protect the safety and livelihoods of garment workers in Bangladesh.”
Among the more damaging perceptions of the Alliance that Ms. Tauscher was likely referring to appeared in the New York Times following our November 18th Conference. According to the New York Times, there were fears that the mandatory financial commitments made by members of the Accord would result in a free-rider problem whereby Alliance members would benefit from the financial contributions made by the Accord without having to make any contributions of their own.
Ms. Tauscher went on to note that the Alliance has made significant progress since it’s formation in July 2013. In particular, Ms. Tauscher noted that the Alliance has conducted baseline surveys and off-site interviews with 3,200 Bangladeshi workers from 28 factories, has trained managers and workers from 218 Alliance factories in fire safety, conducted safety, fire, and electrical inspections on 222 factories that produce goods for Alliance members, and engaged local NGO’s, workers’ organizations, and the Government of Bangladesh.
Mr. Nova on the other hand sought to dispel the misperception that the Accord was a European-led initiative. He noted that the Accord receives substantial support within the United States and extended an open invitation anyone interested in joining the Accord. Additionally, Mr. Nova reiterated the Accord’s commitment to correcting the shortcomings of previous efforts to improve worker safety and rights through the use of a binding and enforceable contract, rigorous factory inspections, and through worker empowerment efforts that allow workers to influence practices in the factory and in the Accord. Moreover, Mr. Nova reminded the Committee of the Accord’s innovative provision that grants workers the right to refuse dangerous work.
While much of the discussion during the hearing did not really touch upon the atrocious conditions of garment workers, Ms. Akter’s moving testimony provided a much needed countervailing force, infused with her own experience. Ms. Akter told of her experiences as a child laborer in a garment factory producing for international brands and retailers. After her father became disabled and could no longer work, Ms. Akter, who was only twelve at the time, turned to employment in the garment sector where she made less than $10 per month, was cheated of overtime pay, and harrassed for trying to organize her co-workers. And this is a crucial reminder: The garment sector, for all its ills, is a vital source of employment which many individuals, particularly women, rely upon for their livelihood. The garment sector has also brought substantial economic growth, particularly in Bangladesh, which is a beneficial aspect that cannot be overlooked.
Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of the Alliance and the Accord is that it represents the decision by a significant number of brands and retailers to help drive improvements in worker safety and rights, rather than moving to other garment producing countries. However, Ms. Akter’s testimony served as a powerful reminder that much work remains to be done. All the talk of improvements and accomplishments at the policy-level is meaningless unless it translates into actual improvements in worker safety and rights for those working in the garment sector.
(BGF) – This article, by Robert Haddick and published by ForeignPolicy.com, discusses China’s actions and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Haddick describes China’s actions, which often encroach upon the territorial and economic claims of its neighbors that are established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as “salami slicing”: “the slow accumulation of small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major strategic change”. Viewing China’s actions in the South China Sea within the “salami slicing” framework, Haddick goes on to address the implications for the United States’ strategic economic and security interests in the region, as well as for China’s neighbors in the South China Sea. To read the full article visit ForeignPolicy.com.
Salami Slicing in the South China Sea
By Robert Haddick
Pentagon recently commissioned recommendations from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on its military basing plans in the Pacific. CSIS’s June 27 report recommended that the Pentagon reallocate forces away from Northeast Asia and toward the South China Sea. Specifically, CSIS called on the Pentagon to base more attack submarines in Guam, beef up the Marine Corps’ presence in the region, and study the possibility of basing an aircraft carrier strike group in Western Australia.
The South China Sea is undoubtedly heating up as a potential flashpoint. Disputes over territory, fishing rights, and oil leases have accelerated this year. A recent ASEAN conference in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, aimed at making progress on a code of conduct for the South China Sea,collapsed in acrimony and failed, for the first time in 45 years, to agree on a concluding joint statement. Vietnam and the Philippines were particularly upset that their Southeast Asian neighbors made no progress on a unified stance against Chinese encroachments in the sea.
The increase in U.S. military power in the region, called for by both the CSIS report and by U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in a June speech in Singapore, is designed in part to deter overt aggression, such as a sudden restart of the Korean War or a Chinese blitzkrieg against Taiwan. To the extent such scenarios are now considered highly remote, the U.S. military presence in the region is doing its job. But what about an adversary that uses “salami-slicing,” the slow accumulation of small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major strategic change? U.S. policymakers and military planners should consider the possibility that China is pursuing a salami-slicing strategy in the South China Sea, something that could confound Washington’s military plans.
Appendix 4 of this year’s annual Pentagon report on China’s military power displays China’s South China Sea claim, the so-called “nine-dash line,” along with the smaller claims made by other countries surrounding the sea. A recent BBC piece shows China’s territorial claim compared to the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has granted to the countries around the sea. The goal of Beijing’s salami-slicing would be to gradually accumulate, through small but persistent acts, evidence of China’s enduring presence in its claimed territory, with the intention of having that claim smudge out the economic rights granted by UNCLOS and perhaps even the right of ships and aircraft to transit what are now considered to be global commons. With new “facts on the ground” slowly but cumulatively established, China would hope to establish de facto and de jure settlements of its claims.
In April, a naval standoff between China and the Philippines occurred when Chinese fishing vessels were caught inside the Philippines EEZ near Scarborough Shoal. The standoff broke up after several weeks without a resolution of the underlying legal issues. Separately, the Philippines now intends to begin drilling for natural gas in the Reed Bank near its Palawan Island, a program to which China objects. A Chinese naval frigate recently ran aground 90 miles off Palawan; last year, Chinese warshipsthreatened to ram a Philippine survey ship near Reed Bank.
Across the sea, and on the eve of the ill-fated Phnom Penh summit, the China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC), a state-owned oil developer, put out a list of offshore blocksfor bidding by foreign oil exploration companies. In this case, the blocks were within Vietnam’s EEZ — in fact, parts of some of these blocks had already been leased by Vietnam for exploration and development. Few analysts expect a foreign developer such as Exxon Mobil to legitimize China’s over-the-top grab of Vietnam’s economic rights. But CNOOC’s leasing gambit is another assertion of China’s South China Sea claims, in opposition to UNCLOS EEZ boundaries most observers thought were settled.
Pentagon recently commissioned recommendations from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on its military basing plans in the Pacific. CSIS’s June 27 report recommended that the Pentagon reallocate forces away from Northeast Asia and toward the South China Sea. Specifically, CSIS called on the Pentagon to base more attack submarines in Guam, beef up the Marine Corps’ presence in the region, and study the possibility of basing an aircraft carrier strike group in Western Australia.
The South China Sea is undoubtedly heating up as a potential flashpoint. Disputes over territory, fishing rights, and oil leases have accelerated this year. A recent ASEAN conference in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, aimed at making progress on a code of conduct for the South China Sea,collapsed in acrimony and failed, for the first time in 45 years, to agree on a concluding joint statement. Vietnam and the Philippines were particularly upset that their Southeast Asian neighbors made no progress on a unified stance against Chinese encroachments in the sea.
The increase in U.S. military power in the region, called for by both the CSIS report and by U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in a June speech in Singapore, is designed in part to deter overt aggression, such as a sudden restart of the Korean War or a Chinese blitzkrieg against Taiwan. To the extent such scenarios are now considered highly remote, the U.S. military presence in the region is doing its job. But what about an adversary that uses “salami-slicing,” the slow accumulation of small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major strategic change? U.S. policymakers and military planners should consider the possibility that China is pursuing a salami-slicing strategy in the South China Sea, something that could confound Washington’s military plans.
Appendix 4 of this year’s annual Pentagon report on China’s military power displays China’s South China Sea claim, the so-called “nine-dash line,” along with the smaller claims made by other countries surrounding the sea. A recent BBC piece shows China’s territorial claim compared to the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has granted to the countries around the sea. The goal of Beijing’s salami-slicing would be to gradually accumulate, through small but persistent acts, evidence of China’s enduring presence in its claimed territory, with the intention of having that claim smudge out the economic rights granted by UNCLOS and perhaps even the right of ships and aircraft to transit what are now considered to be global commons. With new “facts on the ground” slowly but cumulatively established, China would hope to establish de facto and de jure settlements of its claims.
In April, a naval standoff between China and the Philippines occurred when Chinese fishing vessels were caught inside the Philippines EEZ near Scarborough Shoal. The standoff broke up after several weeks without a resolution of the underlying legal issues. Separately, the Philippines now intends to begin drilling for natural gas in the Reed Bank near its Palawan Island, a program to which China objects. A Chinese naval frigate recently ran aground 90 miles off Palawan; last year, Chinese warshipsthreatened to ram a Philippine survey ship near Reed Bank.
Across the sea, and on the eve of the ill-fated Phnom Penh summit, the China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC), a state-owned oil developer, put out a list of offshore blocksfor bidding by foreign oil exploration companies. In this case, the blocks were within Vietnam’s EEZ — in fact, parts of some of these blocks had already been leased by Vietnam for exploration and development. Few analysts expect a foreign developer such as Exxon Mobil to legitimize China’s over-the-top grab of Vietnam’s economic rights. But CNOOC’s leasing gambit is another assertion of China’s South China Sea claims, in opposition to UNCLOS EEZ boundaries most observers thought were settled.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is University Distinguished Service Professor at, and former Dean of, Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, as well as a member of the Boston Global Forum’s Board of Thinkers. He received his bachelor’s degree summa cum laude from Princeton University, did postgraduate work at Oxford University on a Rhodes Scholarship, and earned a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and a Deputy Under Secretary of State. His most recent books include Soft Power, The Power Game: A Washington Novel, The Powers to Lead and Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the British Academy, and the American Academy of Diplomacy. In a recent survey of international relations scholars, he was ranked as the most influential scholar on American foreign policy.
Gov. Michael Dukakis
Co-Founder; Chairman of The Board of Directors and Board of Thinkers, The Boston Global Forum. Democratic Party Nominee for President of the United States, 1988. Distinguished Professor J.D., Harvard University
Michael Stanley Dukakis was born in Brookline, Massachusetts to Greek immigrant parents. He attended Swarthmore College and Harvard Law School and served in the United States Army from 1955-1957, sixteen months of which was with the support group to the U.S. delegation to the Military Armistice Commission in Korea.
He served eight years as a member of the Massachusetts legislature and was elected governor of Massachusetts three times. He was the Democratic nominee for the presidency in 1988.
Since 1991 he has been a distinguished professor of political science at Northeastern University in Boston, and since 1996 visiting professor of public policy during the winter quarter at UCLA in Los Angeles. He is chairman of Boston Global Forum.
He is married to the former Kitty Dickson. They have three children—John, Andrea and Kara—and eight grandchildren.
Professor Thomas E. Patterson
Thomas E. Patterson is Bradlee Professor of Government and the Press at Harvard’s Kennedy School and a co-founder of the Boston Global Forum. His book, The Vanishing Voter, looks at the causes and consequences of electoral participation. His earlier book on the media’s political role, Out of Order, received the American Political Science Association’s Graber Award as the best book of the decade in political communication. His first book, The Unseeing Eye, was named by the American Association for Public Opinion Research as one of the 50 most influential books on public opinion in the past half century.
He also is author of Mass Media Election and two general American government texts: The American Democracy and We the People. His articles have appeared in Political Communication, Journal of Communication, and other academic journals, as well as in the popular press. His research has been funded by the Ford, Markle, Smith-Richardson, Pew, Knight, Carnegie, and National Science foundation.
Patterson received his PhD from the University of Minnesota in 1971.
