



SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR THE
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AGE.
SAFETY, SECURITY, & SUSTAINABILITY
FOR AI WORLD

POLICY BRIEF

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THE RĪGA CONFERENCE
POLICY BRIEF

2020

2020 began on a hopeful note, as all new years do. However, it soon changed to a year that brought us “the new normal” and a completely different understanding of “unusual times”.

Much has happened this year, beginning with the global pandemic, which affects all spheres of life – from healthcare, economy and politics to individual psychological aspects, not to mention the hectic U.S. presidential election campaign, unprecedented wildfires in Australia, the escalating conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the brutal and relentless suppression of peaceful protesters in Belarus in the wake of falsified presidential election, and all this against a backdrop where the international community also celebrated the 75th anniversary of the United Nations.

It has been estimated that a human brain processes about 70,000 thoughts daily, and 95% of them are the same as the day before. Small wonder that so many events are being framed in the context of Covid-19 this year, and thoughts are focused on it. However, this collection of Riga Conference Policy Briefs clearly demonstrates the complexity of international affairs and the fact that focusing on one of their facets is neither productive nor rational.

The influence of Covid-19 on international processes is quite considerable – starting from the questioning of World Health Organization's operability and reputation, confusion in the European Union and the absence of resilience and solidarity, to an Infodemic, triggered by psychological factors and enabled by technology.

Meanwhile, the pandemic has not brought substantial changes to the Euro-Atlantic security policy in its classical sense. Russia has been pursuing large scale military exercises, developing its military capabilities and maintaining an active presence abroad. Strategic rivalry between the United States and China has spilled over from issues centering on the economy and international trade into an all-embracing ideological confrontation concerning values and technological dominance. The European Union has adopted its multiannual financial framework for 2021–2027 and approved a European Union Recovery Instrument; an intensive debate is underway on the goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050, on digital issues, development of the Single Market, solutions to migration, as well as values and the rule of law.

I urge the reader to remain open and curious about a wide range of topics in international politics and pursue their broader interests. The desire to think critically about even the simplest of issues and tasks fosters the path towards both constructive and creative solutions. Let's work for better times together!

Edgars Rinkēvičs
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia

The modern world is globally interconnected, and citizens, goods, and services are constantly moving. Therefore it is obvious to observers that Europe and the World at large are exceptionally vulnerable to the consequences of the world-wide pandemic which cuts contacts, affects business, halts economic activity and endangers the world security and peace.

Frequently, people and governments underestimate the probability of negative scenarios. Almost nobody was ready to face the sudden challenge of Covid-19. Many of us hoped for the best and totally ignored good old Murphy's Law, which says "if it can go wrong, it will go wrong". The same applies to international security issues.

Of course, there are well-known excuses why security and defence issues were not a top priority for state institutions and the public. There are numerous other issues like employment, infrastructure, education which seems more important than investments in defence or military. Younger European generations, particularly in the Western European societies, are overconfident that security is eternal and granted them for free. No wonder that under such conditions and dominating public opinion many countries across Europe are still acting naively when it comes to decision making about security and defence matters.

In the meantime, international organizations, which in many ways have been upholding the peace and post-World War II order, are increasingly dismantling or dismantled. Under such circumstances, in international relations, the role of the nation-states increases, and they are ready to rely on their economic power or even military might to reach their political goals.

Post-Cold War multilateralism is slowly shifting from institutionalism to realpolitik. COVID-19 crisis is only speeding up these changes. As an example, The World Health Organisation and the European Union, both of whom should have been at the forefront of a comprehensive international response to this pandemic, have largely taken a backseat while individual nations have responded unilaterally.

What are the ways to deal with increasing threats to global security posed by the nationalization of international politics? How to evade the principle that "Might is Right"? How to re-establish the working world order based on mutual agreement, justice, and humanity reflecting the realities and necessities of 21st. Century? These are only a few questions I hope we can tackle in Riga Conference, taking into account the number of prestige thinkers taking part in this event.

Artis Pabriks

Minister of Defence of the Republic of Latvia

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INTRODUCTION

Advances in information and communication technologies -- global Internet, social media, Internet of Things and a range of related science-driven innovations -- are recognized almost everywhere and everywhere. Less well appreciated are the accelerated advances in Artificial Intelligence and its far-ranging applications that are shaping a new global ecosystem for which there is no precedent.

The term “artificial intelligence” refers to the theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence -- such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, translation between languages, self-driving cars, and so forth.

Almost everyone recognizes that advances in AI have already altered conventional ways of viewing the world around us. This is creating new realities for everyone -- as well as new possibilities.

NEW GLOBAL IMPERATIVE

NEW REALITY – NEW UNKNOWNNS

Advances in AI are far more rapid that we appreciate. Fully understanding the scale of the AI domain remains elusive. While often anchored in past data, it has made possible whole new sources and forms of design space. We have seen a shift from executing instructions by humans to replicating humans, outperforming humans, and transcending humans. We are at the beginning of a new era, a world of mind-machine convergence with biological drivers for both mind and machine.

Also elusive is the management of embedded insecurities in applications of this new ubiquitous technology and the imperatives of safety and security. When all is said done, AI remains: devoid of consciousness, empathy, and perhaps select other human features, such as ethics, so fundamental to humanity and the social order.

In sum: The world of AI today is framed by a set of unknowns -- known unknowns and unknown unknowns -- where technological innovation interacts with the potential for a total loss of human control.

CRITICAL GLOBAL IMPERATIVE

The expansion of Artificial Intelligence is widely recognized and could change our lives in ways yet unimagined. This expansion has created a new global ecology, one that remains opaque and poorly understood. But without adequate guidelines and useful directives, the undisciplined use of AI poses risks to the wellbeing of individuals and creates fertile ground for economic, political, social, and criminal exploitation. The international community recognizes the challenges and opportunities, as well as the problems and perils,

associated with AI. Many countries have already announced national strategies to promote the proper use and development of AI.

We are now faced with a critical imperative, namely, to address head-on the policy issues raised by AI advances and to assess, evaluate, and respond effectively. We must engage in serious dialogue – buttressed by tolerance, learning and mutual understanding – to converge on principles and practices of an agreement among members of the global society on a strategy to generate and enhance social benefits and wellbeing for all and shared by all. Such a strategy is a Social Contract for the AI Age.

At the core of this imperative is to establish a common understanding for policy and practices, anchored in general principles to help maximise the “good” and minimise the “bad” associated with AI. Derived from the 18th century concept of a social contract—an agreement among the members of society to cooperate for social benefits—Social Contract for the AI Age addresses conditions in the 21st century.

The Social Contract for the AI Age was announced on September 9, 2020, its co-authors are: Governor Michael Dukakis, Boston Global Forum, President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, Latvia and World Leadership Alliance-Club de Madrid, Vint Cerf, Father of Internet, Google, Nazli Choucri, MIT, Prime Minister Zlatko Lagumdžija, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tuan Anh Nguyen, Boston Global Forum, Thomas Patterson, Harvard University, Alex Pentland, MIT, Marc Rotenberg, Michael Dukakis Institute, David Silbersweig, Harvard University.

INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS

AI is also becoming a focus for foreign policy and international cooperation. There is a shared view that no country will be able to compete or meet the needs of its citizens without increasing its AI capacity. At the same time, many countries are now engaged in technology leapfrogging. It is no longer expected, nor necessary, to replicate the stages of economic development of

the West—one phase at a time. While the possibilities are varied and diverse, there is also a clear awareness of the challenges and opportunities, as well as the problems and perils of AI, and many are seeking ways of managing their approach to AI. At least 20 countries have announced formal strategies to promote the use and development of AI.

No two strategies are alike, however there are common themes even among countries who focus on different aspects of AI policy. Among the most common themes addressed are those pertaining to:

- Scientific research
- Talent development
- Skills and education
- Public and private sector collaboration
- Standards and regulations
- Data and digital infrastructure
- Visualization for innovation.

Concurrently, AI is becoming a focus for foreign policy and international co-operation – for both developed and developing states. There is a shared view that no country will be able to compete or meet the needs of its citizens without substantial AI capability. But we must now re-think and consolidate the best practices for human development, recognizing the power and the value of the individual and of society.

More important, many countries are now involved in technology leapfrogging rather than in replicating known trajectories of the past century. It is no longer expected, nor is it necessary, to replicate the stages of economic development of the west –one phase at a time.

Countries now frame their own priorities and strategies. Transcending the diversity of situations and orientations, we already the consolidate of shared goals buttressed by operational strategies, in terms of activities and institutions: These include:

- Funding for culture

- Skills, education, and talent development
- Public and private policy innovation
- Fairness, transparency, and accountability
- Ethics and values for inclusion
- Reliability, security and privacy
- Science-policy links
- Standards for human behavior and regulations
- Data development and digital infrastructure.

In sum, all countries are going through a common experience of adapting to and managing unknowns. All of these venues are generally framed within an overarching context of sustainable development. All of this creates welcoming an international atmosphere that is welcoming to a *Social for the AI Age*.

FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES

There is a long tradition of consensus-based social order founded on cohesion and agreement, and not the use of force nor formal regulation or legislation. It is often a necessary precursor for managing change and responding to societal needs.

The foundational questions are: *what, why, why and how?*

WHAT?

A social contract is about supporting a course of action that is inclusive and equitable. It is designed to focus on relationships among people, governments, and other key entities in society.

WHY?

To articulate the prevailing concerns and find common convergence. And to

frame ways of addressing and managing potential threats – in fair and equitable ways.

WHO?

In today's world, participants in a Social Contract for the AI Age must be inclusive of:

- Individuals as citizens and members of a community
- Governments who execute citizen goals
- Corporate and private entities with business rights and responsibilities
- Civil society that transcends the above
- Innovators of AI and related technologies, and
- Analysts of ethics and responsibility.

None of the above can be “left out.” Each of these constitutes a distinct center of power and influence.

HOW?

The starting point for implementation consists of three foundational principles to provide solid anchors of a Social Contract for the AI Age.

FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE FOR ALL.

The first principle is already agreed upon in the international community as a powerful aspiration. It is the expectation of all entities – private and public -- to treat, and be treated, with fairness and justice.

RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POLICY AND DECISION – PRIVATE AND PUBLIC.

The second principle recognizes the power of the new global ecology that will increasingly span all entities worldwide – private and public, developing and developed.

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE FOR INNOVATIONS AND APPLICATIONS.

The third principle is well established internationally. It does not impede innovation, but supports it. It does not push for regulation, but supports initiatives to explore the unknown with care and caution.

Jointly, these basic foundations – *what, why, who, how* – create powerful foundations for framing and implementing the Social Contract for the AI Age.

TOWARD PROTOCOL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

While the Social Contract for the AI Age carries general principles and directives for its implementation, each country is different, as would be the approach to implementation and adoption. Nonetheless, all individuals, AI participants and centers of power and influence are expected to contribute to framing and implementation. And all have rights and responsibilities that must be articulated and respected.

The initial statement of rights and responsibilities, below, is organized by broad groupings framed in the most general terms:

INDIVIDUALS, CITIZENS, GROUPS:

Everyone is entitled to basic rights and human dignity as well as responsibility:

Data Rights and Responsibilities

- Each individual has a right to privacy.
- Each is entitled to access, control, and manage their own data as desired.

Education and Political Participation

- Each individual has the right to participate directly in political decisions.
- Each has access to basic education/knowledge as well as to the use of AI.

Responsibility

- All individuals are prohibited from engaging adverse behaviors, such as hacking and disseminating disinformation.
- Each will expect penalties for non-compliance.

GOVERNMENTS:

Governments are expected to behave responsibly in the management of AI for governance as well as for interactions with individuals and groups in society:

Governments Standards

- Create incentives for citizens to use AI in ways that benefit society.
- Help design standards for trust in operations.

United Nations and International Organizations:

- Extend sphere to include AI and standards/norms/practices thereof.
- Create and manage a universal digital currency.

BUSINESS ENTITIES:

Business operations and related rights come with accountability and responsibility – nationally and internationally:

- Support independent audits for fairness, accountability, and cybersecurity.

- Uphold common AI values, standards, norms, and data ownership rules, with penalties for noncompliance.

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS:

Rights and responsibilities of civil society organizations include monitoring governments and firms with respect to common values:

- Civil society organizations are responsible for compliance with common values/norms/standards/laws and expect penalties for noncompliance.
- Support and recognize exemplary citizen contributions in AI area.

AI ASSISTANTS:

AI assistants are designed to serve as an interface to facilitate compliance with established standards:

- Support AI users and assist them to serve the broad interests of society.
- Engage with other power centers for mutual support and supervision.

PREFERENCES AND PERFORMANCE

Social Contract in the Cyber Age is designed to help societies transcend current practices and forms of traditional as well as e-government by providing applications of AI to assist decision making for all critical functions. These include provision of public services, performance of civic functions, and evaluation of public officials.

At the same time, every society must manage old as well as new preferences. These are often in the nature of tradeoffs at the intersection of AI and society. They are adjustment mechanisms designed to shape operations and enable implementation. But they can also reflect the prevailing preference overall. To illustrate, among the most salient are:

- Equity vs efficiency
- Growth vs sustainability
- Convenience vs. safety

- Power vs accountability
- Regulation vs innovation
- Security vs. stability.

At the same time, both preferences and performance are bound by the social order and the principles embedded in new Social Contract Societies may have different forms of governance, but it is imperative that capabilities for undertaking two critical functions are guaranteed: The first is the expression of political preference in the form of direct “voting”. The second is access to just protection and due process by an independent judicial system.

SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR AI AGE IN PRACTICE: THE AIWS CITY

So far in this paper we have focused on the framework and principles of a Social Contract for the AI Age. We now turn to practice-in-reality, and essential features to articulate, implement, and apply, principles and standards in operational form. To this end, we design and seek to build the AIWS City.

PURPOSE - OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Our goal is to construct an all-digital, virtual, intelligent, and innovative ecosystem for work – endowed with kindness and consideration, and anchored in intellect. We call this initiative “the AI World Society City” (**the AIWS City**), with domain name: **AIWS.city**. This is an initiative targeted to implementation and to practice – not to concepts per se or to aspiration.

This means that we must consider matters of practice derived from – or anchored in -- from “Social Contract for the AI Age”, which reflects the People Centered Economy, and the Intellectual Society-Thoughtful Intellectual Civil Society. We anticipate using the global Internet – and its connected networks – to help create an ecosystem for work and life supported by AI advances with the philosophy of the People Centered Economy.

We consider the AIWS City to be an application and a practice of what Vint Cerf has called “*The People Centered Economy*.” The core concept, in Vint Cerf’s words is as follows:

"All people can create value for each other. A good economy has an ecosystem of organizations that lets that happen in the most meaningful and fulfilling ways."

In those terms, the motivation and dominant feature is the fulfillment of individual well-being.

This feature overshadows all other conventional driving principles for economic and social activity. It is not to deny the more traditional drivers, rather it is to situate them in, and subsume them into a "people friendly" context

The AIWS City is an all-digital virtual city based on trusted open data, that applies the standards of "Social Contract for the AI Age", "People Centered Economy", "Trustworthy Economy", "Intellectual Society, a thoughtful civil society", and "AI-Government".

By focusing on AI use and reliance we do not "delete" human insight and activity, but we keep in mind the human brain as the "last resort" in any situation of dynamic uncertainty that requires resolution.

Among the key features of AIWS City is a thoughtful intellectual and civil society, are knowledge, critical thinking and social responsibility. The AIWS City can signal to citizens ways to become more thoughtful by enhancing knowledge, critical thinking and social responsibility.

As a pragmatic vision, AIWS City is to be based on AIWS Value in order to create a good Ecosystem of the People Centered Economy - *"all people can create value for each other"*.

The operational slogan is "People Centered AI and Internet Ecosystem for Work and Life".

In this context, AIWS puts forth the concept of **AIWS Value** as follows:

AIWS VALUE = :

- **traditional value** (products, services, data, innovation, creativities, etc.)
X
- **social values** (contributions).

We consider this as a multiplicative not an additive function. This enables a situation where society recognize traditional and social values and can exchange them for AIWS Reward as a digital currency.

MODEL THE AIWS CITY

The pillars of the AIWS City consist of Government of City, Citizens, Companies, and Intellectual Society.

GOVERNMENTS:

- Use **AI-Government** (government assisted by AI, Data Science, and Internet).
- Build **infrastructure** for AI-Government based on Internet and Data Science (AI).
- Create social works for citizens and supports special education programs for citizens, creating **Ecosystem of the AIWS City**.

COMPANIES:

- Apply Trustworthy Economy and support the People Centered Economy.
- Recognize AIWS Rewards as exchangeable digital currency, accept AIWS Rewards in spending of owners of **AIWS Rewards**.

INDIVIDUALS:

- All individuals that accept, respect, and practice the standards and regulations of AIWS City can become its citizen.
- AIWS citizens create values from Ecosystem of the AIWS City, and receive AIWS Rewards for their works.

INTELLECTUAL SOCIETY IN THE AIWS CITY:

- Enhance civil society become intellectual society.
- Promote “**Social Contract for the AI Age**” and **AIWS Value**.
- Collaborate to create **Ecosystem of the AIWS City**.

DESIGN, MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

At this time, we envisage the AIWS City to be designed as special website at **<http://AIWS.city>**, and include:

- AIWS Concert Hall, AIWS Museums, AIWS University, AIWS Auditorium, AIWS Market, AIWS Cultural, Historical Town, AIWS Healthcare, AIWS Stadium, AIWS City Hall, AIWS Honor Houses (Honor house of Michael Dukakis, Vint Cerf, and Board Members of MDI), with platform of block-chain AI.
- Each individual will have a home in AIWS City with components for live, work and entertainments, relax.
- Each home includes a structured data house, and play a role of Databank of AIWS City.
- Since data of individuals in an asset, each person can sign an agreement with Michael Dukakis Institute allowing AIWS City to use their personal data for business business.

In this context, we envisage **AIWS City Board of Leaders** to consist of:

Governor Michael Dukakis, Chairman of the Boston Global Forum, Nguyen Anh Tuan, CEO of The Boston Global Forum, Professor Alex Pentland, MIT, Vint Cerf, Father of the Internet, Chief Internet Evangelist of Google, Professor Nazli Choucri, MIT, Professor Zlatko Lagumdzija, Former Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Professor David Silbersweig, Harvard University, Professor Thomas Patterson, Harvard University, Marc Rotenberg, Director of Center for AI and Digital Policy at Michael Dukakis Institute.

TOWARDS AI SOCIAL CONTRACT INDEX

Critical to the future of the AI Social Contract will be the ability to monitor adoption and implementation. It is not sufficient to simply announce the Social Contract or even to gather signatures of endorsement. The AI Social Contract Index will provide the basis to assess implementation. The Social Contract Index will build on the best practices for reporting country practices, recognizing the limited scope of resources that are currently available for this project. The AI Social Contract Index that will allow policymakers and the public to assess progress toward trustworthy AI based on normative goals. The AI Ethics Index has these objectives: (1) to evaluate a country's AI policies and practices in 2020, (2) to compare the AI policies and practices of various countries in 2020, and (3) to evaluate a country's AI policies and practices over time.

The AI Ethics Index will focus on human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance metrics. Endorsement and implementation of the OECD AI Principles will be among the primary metrics. Opportunities for the public to participate in the formation of national AI policy, as well as the creation of an independent, national commission to address AI challenges, will be included among the metrics. Patents, publications, and national investment strategies are important metrics for AI policies, but they will not be considered here. The AI Ethics Index will be published on an annual basis, and will evolve as country practices change and new issues emerge.

The AI Social Contract is a complex document that seeks a broad range of goals for different groups, including governments, businesses, and individuals. In the first instance, it would be too difficult and unrealistic to assign a metric for each provision of the Social Contract. We have determined to focus on approximately one dozen key questions that will provide an approximation of compliance with the Social Contract. We also propose to focus on the policies

and practices of top 25 countries by GDP, recognizing that these countries will have the greatest impact.

To establish an objective basis to evaluate a particular country's AI policies and practices it is necessary to select well established metrics. It will also be necessary to note that a country's endorsement of a legal framework does not necessarily mean the country complies with the legal framework. To assess country AI policies and practices we will begin with the country's National AI Strategy. Many countries have set out national plans to both promote AI innovation and to safeguard fundamental rights. We will review carefully these policy documents, recognizing that the more difficult task will be to actually assess country practices. We do not intend to review country investment strategies or research objectives. We believe that government agencies and large technical societies will be better equipped to take on that task. But we will look for indicators that countries are willing to invest in "ethical AI," a category that acknowledges broader social interests.

We will look for mechanisms that countries have created for public participation in the development of national AI strategies. This includes not simply inter-governmental coordination and public-private partnerships, but also efforts to engage the general public, civil society, academics, and technical experts, in policy decisions that will have broad social impacts. The easy accessibility of key AI policy documents, as well as opportunities for public comment are a critical requirement.

Endorsement of key policy frameworks will also contribute to our country evaluations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a widely recognized framework for the protection of fundamental rights. Several provisions of the UDHR, such as Article 12 concerning privacy protection, have direct application to the AI field. Endorsement of the OECD AI Principles also provide a key measure of a country's commitment to a human-centric approach for AI. OECD policy frameworks, beginning with the OECD Privacy Guidelines of 1980, have provided an important benchmark for national policies.¹ Of course, en-

¹ OECD, 30 Years After: the Impact of the OECD Privacy Guidelines, 2010, <https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/30yearsaftertheimpactoftheoecdprivacyguidelines.htm>; Remarks of M. Rotenberg, (March 10, 2010), <https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/44946274.doc>

dorsement is not the same as implementation. And so we will attempt to measure country implementation, drawing on the work of the OECD and others.²

Algorithmic transparency is a central to AI accountability, and we will attempt to determine a country's establishment of this fundamental right. Countries that are subject to the General Data Protection Regulation have likely already considered how to implement the provisions, such as Article 22, that could provide a basis for algorithmic transparency. It is likely that there will be other legal bases to establish algorithmic transparency over time. We will include those as well. There are related issues for AI policy assessment, such as the deployment of lethal autonomic weapon systems. Although not a focus of the AI Social Contract Index, we are aware of the global interest in this topic and we plan to note country statements on this issue.

Country reports will highlight both specific achievements and specific controversies in the AI field. The use of medical data, for example, raises complex policy issues that promise both innovation and risk widespread discrimination. We believe that countries should be informed about the successes and failures of others and, through this process, better practices will emerge. Finally, our report will provide both a snapshot of AI policies at a moment in time and identify emerging trends. Over time, our goal is to provide an ongoing assessment that will further lead to better practices.

The European Consumer Association (BEUC) has published a report based on a survey of public attitudes toward AI in several European countries. *Artificial Intelligence: What Consumers Say* examined consumers' knowledge of AI consumers' concerns about AI, and consumers' views on the regulatory framework for AI.³ According to BEUC, consumers consider AI useful believe it will play an important role in many areas of their lives. But consumers also have low trust in AI and concerns about the misuse of personal data and the use of AI to manipulate their decisions. And consumers do not think that the current rules effectively regulate AI.

2 OECD, Examples of AI National Policies, Report for the G20 Digital Economy Task Force, 2020, <https://www.mcit.gov.sa/sites/default/files/examples-of-ai-national-policies.pdf>

3 BEUC, Artificial Intelligence: what consumers say: Findings and policy recommendations of a multi-country survey on AI, 2020.

The AI Social Contract Index aims to maximize the public policy impact of the Social Contract for the Age of AI. The Social Contract for AI Index will take account of these NGO reports. See Appendix 1 for Prior and Related Work.

POLICY DIRECTIONS

AI policy is a rapidly changing field. The Social Contract for the Age of AI sets out a broad range of policy goals, many of which are difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, the articulation of policy goals without a mechanism to assess progress could have little impact. The issues and suggestions in Part IV result from a set of deliberations, noted below

EARLIER DELIBERATIONS

Among the previous policy discussions of note are the following:

- May 5, 2020 the Boston Global Forum (BGF) announced, and May 12, the first discussion, call for Democratic Alliance on Digital Governance, then
- June 17, 8 countries launched GPAI (Global Partnership on AI)
- July 1, 2020, BGF organized a conference Democratic Alliance on Digital Governance with distinguished speakers: Senators of Australia, UK, EU, and former presidents, prime ministers and distinguished professors Joseph Nye, etc. to discuss the Democratic Alliance to maintain peace and security in the world. The conclusion is that the world needs a Democratic Alliance on Digital Governance.

PROPOSED ACTIONS

We propose to establish a **Working-Group for Democratic Alliance on Digital Governance** – consisting of political leaders, distinguished thinkers and practitioners, business leaders initially from USA, Japan, India, Australia to frame and propose operational initiatives worldwide, beginning these four major countries.

In this connection, we consider BGF and AIWS.net to be the kernels for this global initiative designed to support democratic values and shared principles,

and pursue the standards of Social Contract for the AI Age. Operationally, this means the following:

One: Consider the Standards of Social Contract for the AI Age as Platform of Interaction among Governments

This function is akin to the use of TCP/IP a standard for Internet connection, respected by all users.

Two: Create the Democratic Alliance for Digital Governance

The development of the Democratic Alliance for Digital Governance is envisioned as global authority providing oversight over the Social Contract for the AI Age, and to maintain for the AI Age.

Based on the efforts of the Working-Group for Democratic Alliance on Digital Governance, we anticipate the first members of Democratic Alliance on Digital Governance to be US, Japan, India, Australia.

Three: Critical goals include support for:

- 1. Use of AI for observing, monitoring, and evaluating** conflicts among countries, disputed territories, and other types of disputes.
- 2. Recognition of AIWS Values and Rewards** by governments rendering AIWS Reward as an exchangeable digital currency.

WORK RELATED TO THE AIWS INDEX

EARLIER REPORTS

There are several earlier reports that provide the basis for AI Social Contract Index. One of the most influential reports in the human rights field is the annual *Country Report on Human Rights Practices – the Human Rights Reports* – which surveys internationally recognized human rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements.⁴ These reports, prepared by the U.S. Department of State, provide detailed assessment by country of practices and policies. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a foundational document in the human rights field, provides the primary guidance.⁵

Beginning in 1998, Rotenberg and several colleagues in the privacy field adopted human rights reporting practices to the specific challenges associated with human rights and technology policy. They produced in that year *Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Practices* and *Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy*.⁶

The *Cryptography and Liberty* report, conducted jointly with a network of experts around the world, provided the first overview of country practices concerning encryption, a technology deemed essential for both economic development and privacy protection.⁷ Approximately 75 countries were surveyed in the first *Cryptography and Liberty* report.

4 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 11, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>

5 Several international NGOs also publish substantial human rights surveys with detailed country reports. These include the annual reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Freedom House publishes annual reports with detailed quantitative assessments concerning political rights and civil liberties.

6 Global Internet Liberty Campaign, *Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Practices*, 1998, <http://gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html>. By 2006, the annual *Privacy and Human Rights* report was more than 1,100 pages and contained 6,000 footnotes. <https://www.amazon.com/Privacy-Human-Rights-Report-2006/dp/8930442897/>.

7 Global Internet Liberty Campaign, *Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy*, 1998, <http://gilc.org/crypto/crypto-survey.html>

The report set out designations for country practices from Green (most favorable) to Red (least favorable). As the report explained, “A ‘Green’ designation signifies that the country has either expressed support for the OECD Guidelines on Cryptography, which generally favor unhindered legal use of cryptography, or has no cryptography controls. A ‘Yellow’ designation signifies that the country has proposed new cryptography controls, including domestic use controls, or has shown a willingness to treat cryptographic-enabled software as a dual-use item under Wassenaar. A ‘Red’ designation denotes countries that have instituted sweeping controls on cryptography, including domestic use controls. Some countries do not fit neatly into one of the three categories, but trends may show them as being borderline, i.e., ‘Yellow/Red.’” The *Cryptography and Liberty* report found that, “Most countries in the world today do not have controls on the use of cryptography. In the vast majority of countries, cryptography may be freely used, manufactured, and sold without restriction.”

Subsequent editions of the *Cryptography and Liberty* survey noted changes in country practices. For example, the 1999 survey found that Canada, Cyprus, Indonesia, and Ireland, among others, adopted more liberal policies on encryption, while Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, and others imposed new restrictions.⁸ The longitudinal character of the report also made possible the detection of emerging trends. For example, the 2000 *Cryptography and Liberty* report found that “The international relaxation of regulations concerning encryption has largely succeeded. The rise of electronic commerce and the recognition of the need to protect privacy and increase the security of the Internet has resulted in the development of policies that favor the spread of strong encryption worldwide.”⁹

The initial *Cryptography and Liberty* report followed the 1997 OECD Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines for Cryptography Policy, the first international framework that aimed to promote both technological innovation and to safeguard fundamental rights. Much as the 1997 OECD Cryptography Guidelines provided the basis for the *Cryptography and Liberty* report, the 2020

8 EPIC, Global Internet Liberty Campaign, *Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy*, 1999, <https://www.amazon.com/Cryptography-Liberty-1999-International-Encryption/dp/1893044033>

9 EPIC, Global Internet Liberty Campaign, *Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy*, 2000, <https://epic.org/reports/crypto2000.html/>

OECD AI Principles will provide the baseline for the AI Social Contract Index. In both instances, the goal is to assess country practices for technologies that implicate both economic growth and fundamental rights.

RELATED WORK

Several NGOs have recently published important surveys that review current country practices for AI as well as public attitudes. In 2018, Access Now published *Mapping Regulatory Proposals for Artificial Intelligence in Europe*.¹⁰ Access Now described a tension between the vast quantities of training data typically obtained for machine learning techniques and the efforts of oversight bodies to subject AI to meaningful control. Access Now warned of a “potential crisis of trust” between citizens, Internet companies, and governments over the risk of AI.

A 2019 report by Algorithm Watch examined AI practices in 12 EU member countries.¹¹ Regarding “predictive analytics used for forecasting human behaviour, be it in elections, criminal activity, or of minors,” the organization said that there “must be democratically controlled by a combination of regulatory tools, oversight mechanisms, and technology.” The organization also found a lack of a lack of civil society engagement in AI policy and concern that oversight bodies may lack the expertise to assess AI systems.

10 https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/11/mapping_regulatory_proposals_for_AI_in_EU.pdf.

11 Algorithm Watch, *Automating Society: Taking Stock of Automated Decision-Making in the EU*, 2019, https://algorithmwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Automating_Society_Report_2019.pdf

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