The X Factors: How Third Parties Destabilize US-China Relations

Apr 4, 2014News

2014-04-03 06.42.05 pm

(Photo Credit: Flickr/US State Department)

(BGF) – In this article, published in The Diplomat, Shannon Tiezzi argues that third parties, namely the Philippines, Japan, and North Korea, have the potential to destabilize U.S.-Chinese relations. As Tiezzi notes, the U.S. defense of the Philippines’ actions on the Second Thomas Shoal and the U.S. commitment to defend Japan in the event that conflict breaks out over the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu in China) has raised tensions between the U.S. and China. Likewise, the U.S. feels that China is not taking sufficient measures to control North Korea’s actions, such as the recent missile launches. This highlights the role that third parties play in U.S.-Chinese relations. Accordingly, the U.S. and China need to remember that these third parties are autonomous states who will act in their own interest. Potentially this could help minimize the impact of third parties on the U.S. relationship with China. To read the full article click here or visit The Diplomat‘s website.

The X Factors: How Third Parties Destabilize US-China Relations

By Shannon Tiezzi

As fellow Diplomat blogger Zach Keck wrote yesterday, the dispute between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoal, known in the Philippines as Ayungin Shoal and in China as Ren’ai Reef, is heating up. A Philippine transport ship has been grounded on the shoal since 1999, with Filipino troops stationed aboard as a sign of Philippine control of disputed territory. On Sunday, China for the first time blocked civilian vessels that were headed to Second Thomas Shoal on a resupply run.

Since then, the Philippines and China have traded diplomatic barbs, each side accusing the other of violating international law and agreements. On Wednesday, the U.S. State Department waded into the fray, and predictably backed its ally. According to the Associated Press, Spokesperson Jen Psaki called China’s action “a provocative move that raises tensions.” She added, “Pending resolution of competing claims in the South China Sea, there should be no interference with the efforts of claimants to maintain the status quo.”

The Chinese government was incensed enough at these remarks to offer a special statement in response to Psaki’s comments. In the statement, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang reiterated China’s claim that the Philippine vessels on their way to Second Thomas Shoal “were loaded with concrete and rebar rather than food,” suggesting that the Philippines was seeking to build additional facilities on the shoal. “It is an out-and-out provocation,” Qin said. Qin also argued that the original grounding of the ship in 1999 was itself an illegal change to the status quo. In regards to Psaki’s comments, Qin said they were “in disregard of facts” and “inconsistent with its non-party capacity.”

China says the ships represent an illegal attempt to build on the reef; the Philippines insists the ships were stocked with food and water as a “humanitarian mission” to resupply the soldiers on the grounded vessel. The diplomatic row over the cargo and intentions of the Philippine ships may be just beginning. According toReuters, a “senior military official” from the Philippines has said that Manila plans to send another round of civilian ships to the disputed reef.

The China-Philippine dispute is just the latest example of the way third parties influence U.S.-China relations—usually for the worse. China and the U.S. are engaged in a long-term strategic battle for influence in the Asia-Pacific region. China, with its growing economic, diplomatic, and military might, expects to be the top dog in its own backyard, while the U.S. does not want to vacate its role as the dominant presence (Washington would say guarantor of stability) in the region. Yet this sort of long-term strategic battle is generally kept on a low boil, with little threat of tensions actually spilling over. In the short term, U.S.-China relations are generally shaken not by intrinsic differences between Washington and Beijing, but by disagreements involving third parties.

The example of the Philippines is one typical such case. As the Philippines is a U.S. ally, Washington (despite its officially neutral stance on the dispute itself) has repeatedly voiced concern over Chinese actions that deny Philippine access to disputed territories.  The China-Philippines disputes are flashpoints where the long-term U.S.-China strategic competition erupts into present-day friction. As such, the decisions and comments of Philippine officials have an outsized impact on U.S.-China relations, forcing both Beijing and Washington to respond (and placing them on opposing sides).

Japan is another such “x-factor,” where a third party’s actions have serious consequences for U.S.-China relations. Indeed, although China-Japan tensions have received less attention lately, the disputes over territory and historical memory have even more serious consequences for U.S.-China relations. The U.S. has gone on record as saying that the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu in China) fall under the purview of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty—meaning that, should conflict break out over the islands, the U.S. would be obligated to assist Japan. As such, escalatory moves by Japan could have serious consequences for the U.S.-China relationship. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine last December, as well as inflammatory comments about wartime history from Japanese officials, have contributed to the rapid decline in China-Japan relations, with a corresponding dip in U.S.-China ties.

Click here to read the full article.